The Measurement Problem: Decoherence and Convivial Solipsism by Zwirn, Herve
1 
 
The Measurement Problem: Decoherence and Convivial Solipsism1 
(Long version) 
HERVE ZWIRN   
 UFR de Physique (LIED, Université Paris 7), CMLA (ENS Cachan, France) & IHPST (CNRS, France)   
herve.zwirn@gmail.com 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The problem of measurement is often considered as an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism. Many attempts 
to solve (or to dissolve) it have been made since the inception of quantum mechanics. The form of these attempts 
depends on the philosophical position that their authors endorse. I will review some of them and analyze their 
relevance. The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution lying inside the pure quantum 
formalism and not demanding any particular philosophical assumption. Nevertheless, a widely debated question 
is to decide between two different interpretations.  The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the 
effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the 
same job as the reduction postulate.  For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic 
superposed state can be observed, so explaining the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the 
quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears. In this case, 
explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do. In this paper, I examine the arguments 
that have been given for and against both interpretations and defend a new position, the “Convivial Solipsism”, 
according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer, different but in close parallel to the 
Everett’s interpretation and sharing also some similarities with Rovelli’s relational interpretation and Quantum 
Bayesianism. I also show how “Convivial Solipsism” can help getting a new standpoint about the EPR paradox 
providing a way out of the standard dilemma that is having to choose between abandoning either realism or locality.  
Keywords: Measurement problem, consciousness, decoherence, realism, entanglement, non locality  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum mechanics works extremely well to predict the results of measurement. No example of conflict 
between experiments and predictions has been found yet. So, if you are interested in predictions of 
experiments and only in predictions of experiments, you can stop here. But if you are wondering just a 
little bit more about the formalism that is used to make these predictions then you open the door to a 
series of questions that seem not easy at all to answer. For example, you could be interested in knowing 
whether quantum formalism is only a list of recipes, the terms it contains having no other meaning than 
the one directly linked to the results of experiments, or if these terms mean something more, being 
related in some way to the real world that we seem to live in. You could think that the formalism is 
nothing else but the simple reflection of your knowledge of the system. You could as well be interested 
in knowing whether it is possible to give a description of what happens “between” experiments or if this 
question is meaningless. Trying to answer to only one of these questions leads to examine a whole set 
of analogous questions that are intertwined into a complex network of relationship. One central question 
that is at the core of all the others is the measurement problem. 
                                                          
1 This paper is a widely extended version of a conference I gave at the 14th annual international symposium “Frontiers of Fundamental Physics” 
(FFP14) in Marseille (France) in July 2014 [1]. 
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Although I don’t share his realist point of view when Bell says [2]: 
“But it is interesting to speculate on the possibility that a future theory will not be intrinsically 
ambiguous and approximate. Such a theory could not be fundamentally about measurements for that 
would again imply incompleteness of the system and unanalyzed interventions from the outside. Rather 
it should again become possible to say of a system not that such and such may be observed but rather 
that such and such be so.” 
and that I think, on the contrary, that it is unavoidable that the concept of measurement be deeply rooted 
inside any quantum theory as its main object, I think that Bell is one of those who have described in the 
most accurate and explicit way the lacuna of the commonly agreed presentations of the quantum 
formalism. It is an illusion to believe that the process of measurement is correctly described in the usual 
treatments such as provided in the majority of textbooks (except if it is only FAPP i.e. “for all practical 
purposes”) and Bell shows that very clearly [3]: 
“The first charge against ‘measurement’, in the fundamental axioms of quantum mechanics, is that it 
anchors there the shifty split of the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. [….] It remains that the theory 
is ambiguous in principle, about exactly when and exactly how the collapse occurs, about what is 
microscopic and what is macroscopic, what quantum and what classical. ” 
and: 
“What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ‘measurer’? Was the wave function of 
the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of year until a single-celled living creature 
appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system … with a PhD?” 
The measurement problem lies at the very heart of the conceptual problems of interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. Depending on the stance they adopt, physicists put up with the difficulty more or less easily. 
The problem is more acute for those who endorse a realist position assuming that the wave function (or 
the state vector) represents the real state of the system than for those, as instrumentalists, who think that 
the formalism is but a tool allowing us to make predictions about future results of experiments. For 
physicists like John Bell, who want to maintain the view that physics must describe things as they really 
are, the problem is so serious that he says [3] he can’t be satisfied with standard quantum mechanics 
(even if he acknowledges that it is working perfectly well for all practical purposes). In this case, 
quantum mechanics is not considered as complete and must be either completed by hidden variables or 
modified to welcome a dynamical process allowing for the state reduction. Another possibility is also 
to admit that the quantum formalism is not universal and that there are “entities” for which it is not 
applicable. On the contrary, for Bohr and the supporters of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation, 
quantum mechanics is complete and there is no problem if a correct epistemological distinction between 
the apparatus and the system is made2. Nevertheless, whatever position is adopted, it is not so easy to 
completely get rid of the problem despite what some authors seem to have claimed.  
In this paper, I first state the problem under its most usual form and then I examine what, in this 
formulation, is directly related to hidden assumptions that could be eliminated in order to avoid the 
difficulties. I then show that many previously proposed solutions are not entirely satisfying and replace 
them in the philosophical context on which they rest. I present the consequences of the EPR paradox, 
Kochen Specher theorem and Bell’s inequalities that must be taken into account if one wants to provide 
a coherent and acceptable interpretation. I give a series of puzzling questions to which any serious 
interpretation should reply and I stress the fact that it is the case for no previous interpretation. I analyze 
then the decoherence program which has often been understood as providing a solution of the 
measurement problem using only standard rules of the quantum formalism. I show that this is not the 
case. I conclude that, if we want to stay inside the standard quantum formalism (without switching to 
                                                          
2 Of course this is an oversimplified presentation of Bohr’s position which will be discussed in §3.2 in much more details. 
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hidden variables theories or involving some modification of the Schrödinger equation) it seems 
impossible to define what a measurement is without any reference to a conscious observer. I give then 
a presentation of the so-called “Convivial Solipsism” which aims at switching to a point of view 
according to which it is unavoidable that the observer be placed at the center of the process of 
measurement. I show how Convivial Solipsism can help understanding the EPR paradox in a new way, 
providing a path out of the standard dilemma of having to choose between abandoning either realism or 
locality. At last, I argue to say that Convivial Solipsism is giving a global coherent interpretation 
answering every question of the series of puzzles. 
In order for this paper to be self-sufficient and at the price of being a little bit longer than it could be 
possible would I assume the reader to be already familiar with all these results, I will present explicitly 
all is needed to understand which questions beg for an answer and why Convivial Solipsism provides 
an interpretation answering them. 
 
2. The measurement problem 
 
2.1. Formulation of the problem 
Quantum formalism contains two postulates for computing the evolution of the state of a system. The 
first one is the Schrödinger equation: 𝑖𝑖ℏ 𝑑𝑑|Ψ⟩
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐻𝐻|Ψ⟩ which is supposed to be used for an isolated system 
when no measurement is performed on it. The second one is the reduction postulate which says that 
when a measurement of a certain observable P is made on a system which is initially in a state that is a 
superposition of eingenstates of P, |Ψ⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩, then after the measurement, if the result is λk, one 
eigenvalue of P, the state |Ψ⟩ is projected onto the eigenvector |𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘⟩ linked to this eigenvalue 
∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ →  |𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘⟩ or onto the sub space of the Hilbert space that is spanned by the eigenvectors linked to 
λk, if λk is degenerated.  
Now these two computations do not lead to the same result. We follow here the notorious analysis given 
by von Neumann [4]. A measurement is an interaction between a system and an apparatus. Let the 
system S be in a state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ and the apparatus A be in the initial state |𝐴𝐴0⟩. Then, before they 
interact, the state of the system – apparatus is the tensorial product  |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩ =  ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩    (1) 
The interaction between S and A is done through a Hamiltonian HAS operating during a short time. It is 
assumed that the apparatus is built in such a way that if the measurement is made on a system that is in 
the state |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩, the apparatus will be in the state |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ after the measurement whatever its initial state.   
Let’s consider that a measurement is made on the system S and that a value λk is found (let’s suppose 
that it is not degenerated).  The reduction postulate gives: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ →  |𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘⟩ and  |𝐴𝐴0⟩ →  |𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘⟩    (2) 
This is the usual description of a measurement. The apparatus is observed in the state |𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘⟩ which is 
correlated to |𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘⟩ and it is hence inferred that the value of P for the system is λk  and that the state of 
the system is projected onto the state |𝜑𝜑𝑘𝑘⟩. For example, if the system is a spin ½ particle and the 
apparatus a detector with a needle such as a spin +1/2 along Oz leads to a position of the needle pointing 
up (and a spin -1/2, a position of the needle pointing down) then equation (2) means that at the end of 
the measurement the needle is either pointing up and the spin of the particle is +1/2 or pointing down 
and the spin of the particle is -1/2 whatever the initial state of the particle be.   
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But it is as well possible to consider the system-apparatus as an isolated global system on which no 
measurement is made. In this case, the Schrodinger equation which describes a linear and unitary process 
gives: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩ → ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩     (3) 
Equation (3) shows that after the interaction, the system and the apparatus are in an entangled state. In 
particular, this is to be interpreted as if the apparatus was in a state which is a superposition of states 
linked to different possible results of the measurement3. In the above example of a spin ½ particle, 
equation (3) leads to a state of the needle that is a superposition of positions up and down. Of course, no 
such macroscopic superposition has ever been observed. If we add another system (even a cat or a man) 
to the initial system and the apparatus, it becomes entangled as well with the first two. This is the core 
of the celebrated Schrödinger’s cat argument [5] and Wigner’s friend problem [6]. 
It is worth noticing that there is a difference in the way it is possible to use these two rules. The 
Schrödinger equation can be used without any further knowledge on the system. All that is necessary to 
compute the future state at an arbitrary time is the initial state |Ψ⟩ and the Hamiltonian H of the system. 
Using the reduction postulate requires the knowledge of the result provided by the measurement. That 
could seem harmless as it is the case for example in classical statistical physics where one has only a 
probability distribution on the possible states of the system and where one updates the state when 
learning in which one of the possible states the system really is. But in quantum physics, this statistical 
interpretation is totally ruled out as we are going to show.  
 
2.2. Is a direct statistical interpretation possible? 
It could indeed be tempting to think that quantum formalism is usable only for sets of systems and that 
an “easy” interpretation of  superposed states is that they represent statistical descriptions of mixtures 
of systems each one in a definite state corresponding to a classical state.  
In this case, a set of N systems in the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ would be identical to a set of N systems such 
that a proportion |𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|2 is in the state |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩. Hence we could recover an interpretation similar to the 
interpretation of classical statistical physics. A first easy way to see that it is wrong is to consider the 
example of a set of N spin ½ particles in the state:  |𝛹𝛹� = 1
√2
 |+�
𝑧𝑧
+ 1
√2
 |−�
𝑧𝑧
     (4) 
Let’s call it set 1. A measurement of the spin along Oz of one of these particles will give the result + in 
half of the cases (and the result – in the other half). Assuming that this set 1 is identical to a set where 
half of the particles are in the state  |+�
𝑧𝑧
 (hence having a spin + along Oz) and the other half in the state  |−�
𝑧𝑧
(hence having a spin – along Oz) is coherent with any measurement along the axis Oz (let’s call 
this new set, set 2). But, if we measure the spin along the axis Ox, then the results are different. For set 
1 the result will always be +, while for set 2, the result will be + in half of the cases and – in the other 
half. These two sets leading to different predictions for the measurement along Ox cannot be identical.  
More generally, the interferences appearing between different terms of the superposition show that this 
interpretation is definitely wrong. Assume that we consider two observables A and B that do not 
commute and that the system is in a state: 
                                                          
3 Actually, the apparatus being in an entangled state with the system has no state by itself strictly speaking since through this entanglement 
only the system S+A has a state. So, it is only a convenient way to speak to say that it is in a superposition of |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩. The reason why we can 
safely do that is the fact that the predictions on the apparatus alone (considered as a sub system of S+A) that we can draw from the entangled 
state of S+A are similar to the predictions we could draw from an equivalent superposition of |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩. The correct formalism in this case is the 
density matrix that we will describe in the following. 
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|𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖|𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⟩𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗       (5) 
with  ∑ |𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖|2𝑖𝑖 = ∑ �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�2𝑗𝑗  = 1 where the iA (resp. jB) are the eingenvalues of A (resp. B) and the |𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⟩ (resp. |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩) are the eigenvectors of A (resp. B) linked to the corresponding eigenvalues. Let’s assume that: 
⟨𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ = 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  so that     |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ =  ∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⟩𝑖𝑖 . Hence: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗 = ∑ ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆⟩𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗     (6) 
Let’s consider a set of N systems such that a proportion �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�
2 is in the state |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩. The probability to get 
the result 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 if a measurement of A is made on a system in the state |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ is �𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�2 so the probability to 
get the result 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 if a measurement is made on a system from this set is �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�
2
�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�
2
. Now the probability 
to get the same result if a measurement of A is made on a system in the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗  is 
�∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �
2 which is different from �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�
2
�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�
2
 because it contains the interference terms 
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗′
∗ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗′∗𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗≠𝑗𝑗′ . 
 
That proves that it is not possible to identify the superposed state  |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗  of a system to a state 
where the system is in one definite eigenvector |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ with the probability�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�2 or to identify a set of N 
systems in the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗  to a set of N systems such that a proportion �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�2 is in the state |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩. A superposed state is not interpretable as a classical description of the probabilistic ignorance about 
the real definite state in which the system is.  Hence, if we consider that quantum mechanics is complete 
(i.e. that is cannot be completed by hidden variables as we will analyze in §3.1.2), a quantum 
measurement cannot be considered as a process simply revealing a pre-existing value. 
 
2.3. What is a measurement? 
The conclusion of §2.2 shows that the problem of the incompatibility between the two descriptions of a 
measurement remains unsolved. The problem is that both descriptions seem equally valid though they 
lead to totally different states. Now, the Schrödinger equation describes a linear and unitary process 
while the reduction postulate is neither linear nor unitary. That means that there is a priori no way we 
can get a reduction of the state through the Schrödinger equation. 
That would not be a problem if it was possible to give a clear and not ambiguous definition of what a 
measurement is. In this case, we would have two well separated situations, a first one when no 
measurement is made on the system and a second one when a measurement is made. In the first case, 
we should apply the Schrödinger equation and in the second one, the reduction postulate.  
Is it possible to define clearly what a measurement is? What many physicists are looking for is a 
definition that could be regarded as “strongly objective” in the meaning that d’Espagnat gave to this 
term [7] (i.e. without any mention to a human observer)4. Widely accepted by a large majority of 
physicists who wanted to believe that it solves all problems, the Copenhagen interpretation, mainly 
proposed by Bohr, says that a measurement is an interaction between the system and a macroscopic 
classical apparatus5. Is this interpretation strongly objective? In the following, we are going to see that, 
despite the appearance, it is not the case. We will also present and analyze several other interpretations 
that have been proposed to solve the measurement problem. 
                                                          
4 See for example [8] for a typical exposition of this quest. 
5 It even goes as far as saying that the property that is measured belongs not to the system itself but to the whole composed of the system plus 
the apparatus. 
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3. Many interpretations 
 
Faced to what seems a real inconsistency inside the quantum formalism, physicists have proposed many 
solutions largely depending on their initial philosophical inclination. A very rough description of the 
different families of positions is the following:  
 
- A first one is the family of instrumentalist positions which consider that quantum mechanics is nothing 
but a tool to predict the results of the experiments done by the physicists. The formalism is then a list of 
recipes that must be applied in strictly following the rules and that do not speak of something else than 
the results of the experiments.  For the instrumentalists, wondering if there is an external reality 
independent of any observer and trying to know the properties of this reality, or asking for what happens 
between the experiments, are at best questions they do not want to consider and at worst questions that 
they consider as meaningless. Bohr’s position and the Copenhagen interpretation are instrumentalist as 
we will see. Belonging to the same family, the pragmatist interpretation (in the spirit of William James 
and John Dewey) tries to stick to the practice of the physicists and often takes as basic given facts some 
features (for example, the unicity of the result of a measurement) that other interpretations want to 
explain [9 - 11]. Some pragmatist positions (for example Healey [12]) are nevertheless not 
instrumentalist but partially realist. 
 
- A second one is the realism (the association of the metaphysical realism, the epistemic realism and the 
scientific realism to be more precise) which considers that there is an external reality which exists 
independently of any observer (metaphysical realism), that this reality is roughly similar to the way it 
appears to us, that it would be unchanged even if there were no human beings, that it is possible to 
describe and to understand it (epistemic realism) and that the scientific formalism aims at describing the 
world as it really is (scientific realism). This was the natural position of the majority of scientists during 
the nineteenth century and it is in this framework that the standard initial formulation of quantum 
mechanics was done by Dirac and von Neumann. This was the position of Einstein, Schrödinger, Bell, 
de Broglie and Bohm. It is worth mentioning that despite the problems it faces, it is still the current 
philosophical position of many physicists who do not want to be involved in what they call 
“metaphysical questions”.  
 
- A third one is the idealism which gives the primacy to the spirit and considers that what we perceive 
is nothing but a creation of our mind. Many different sorts of idealism exist depending on the degree to 
which they accept or refuse the concept of reality. The most extreme kind of idealism is the solipsism 
which denies that there exist something else than one’s own personal mind (as we will see, Convivial 
Solipsism is not that extreme and allows for the existence of other minds and of something external to 
the mind). More prudently, the idealism can limit itself to affirm that the only reality we have access to 
is our perceptions and that postulating every other kind of reality is at best risky. Kant‘s transcendental 
idealism does not deny that there is a reality, the things in themselves, but states that there is an 
unbridgeable gap between the phenomena that we perceive and the noumena that are unknowable and 
out of reach.  
 
I am now going to present the main interpretations that have been put forward to try solving the 
measurement problem. First I will present solutions that imply modifying the quantum formalism and 
then I will stay for the remaining part of the paper inside the standard quantum mechanics. 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
3.1. Modifying quantum mechanics 
 
3.1.1. The “Correctness of the Quantum Formalism” assumption 
I first start by making an assumption which seems very reasonable about the quantum formalism. Due 
to the huge number of successful tests that it has undergone, I will assume that all its presently testable 
predictions are right. That means neither that it is impossible that some prediction that is presently out 
of reach to test could not be false (we’ll see below that some other formalisms can differ from the 
quantum one with respect to some predictions that are presently impossible to test) nor that quantum 
formalism is the only one able to make these predictions. It is even possible that another formalism 
makes some predictions not done by the quantum formalism provided that these predictions not be in 
disagreement with some prediction from the quantum formalism. This assumption only means that all 
the predictions from the quantum formalism that we could test in principle by an experiment that is 
currently feasible would be confirmed if we did the experiment. Hence we will demand from any rival 
formalism to make exactly the same predictions on pain of being disqualified. 
Assumption of Correctness of Quantum Formalism (CQFA): 
“All the predictions made by the quantum formalism that are presently testable through a feasible 
experiment would be confirmed if we did the experiment”.  
In this paper, I will suppose that CQFA is true and I will consider only alternative theories respecting 
CQFA. 
 
3.1.2. Welcoming hidden variables 
Let’s recall the conclusion of §2.2: solving the measurement problem in considering that the superposed 
state  |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗  of a system is a state where the system is in one definite eigenvector |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ with 
the probability�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�
2 or that a set of N systems in the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩𝑗𝑗  is a set such that a proportion 
�𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�
2 of the N systems is in the state |𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵⟩ is not possible. That means that the pure quantum formalism 
does not allow to interpret the probabilistic predictions of a superposed state in a statistical way. 
Is it nevertheless possible to consider that, even though quantum formalism is not suited to take them 
into account, properties of individual systems possess well defined values prior to the measurement that 
reveals them? These properties could be given by additional parameters completing the usual quantum 
description in such a way that, though the quantum state does not allow to predict the value possessed 
by an observable, this observable has nevertheless a definite value that would be computable in 
principle, would one know the unknown parameters linked to the system. These parameters are called 
hidden variables. The state vector would then describe an ensemble of systems and each individual 
element of this ensemble would have a definite value for every observable that would be revealed by 
the measurement. In this case, we could recover a statistical interpretation of the probabilistic predictions 
of quantum mechanics. This is the hope of those, as Einstein, who think that quantum mechanics is not 
complete.  
For several decades, this hope seemed impossible due to a proof given by von Neumann in 1932 [4] that 
hidden variables were impossible. It is now well known that von Neumann’s proof relies on an 
assumption that is much too demanding. To understand that, let’s consider a reasonable set of 
assumptions for a hidden variables theory6. Given a state representing an ensemble of systems with 
                                                          
6 I follow here Mermin [13] for a very simple proof of the Bell, Kochen, Specker theorem. 
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observables A, B, C, …, to each system is assigned a numerical value v(A), v(B), v(C), …, for each 
observable, in such a way that if a measurement is performed on a set of commuting observables, the 
results must be the corresponding values. The theory must give a rule for every state explaining the 
distribution of these values over the elements of the ensemble in order to recover statistically the 
predictions of quantum mechanics when many measurements are performed on the systems of this 
ensemble. Of course, the allowed values for an observable are limited to its eigenvalues. Moreover, 
since any relation f(A,B,C,…) = 0 satisfied by a set of commuting observables is also satisfied by the 
eigenvalues linked to their common eigenvectors, it has also to be satisfied by the values assigned to 
any individual system, so f(v(A),v(B),v(C),…) = 0. In particular, if A and B commute, 
v(A+B)=v(A)+v(B)7. Von Neumann’s assumption was to require that last relation to hold even when A 
and B do not commute8. Having rejected this condition, Bell constructed a very simple hidden variables 
model for one spin ½ fully satisfying the more reasonable requirements above [14]. Would it be possible 
to generalize this model, we would have a possible solution to the measurement problem since the 
superposed states of quantum mechanics could merely be interpreted as statistical sets of systems having 
well defined properties. A hidden variables theory would be in the same relation to quantum mechanics 
than classical mechanics is to classical statistical mechanics. But things are not so simple. What has 
been possible for one single spin ½ particle is no more possible for two independent spin ½ particles. 
Let’s consider the Pauli matrices 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 and the nine observables shown in the figure below: 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥
1        𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2      𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥1𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2 
𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦
2        𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦1      𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦1𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 
𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥
1𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦
2    𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥2𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦1   𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧1𝜎𝜎𝑧𝑧2 
 
Fig 1. 
 
 
Let’s prove that it is not possible to assign values to all these nine observables. It’s easy to check that 
the observables in each row and each column are mutually commuting. The product of the three 
observables of the right column is -1 while the product of the three observables of the other columns as 
well as the product of the three observables of each row is +1.  As we have seen, the values assigned to 
mutually commuting observables must obey any identities satisfied by the observables themselves. But 
this is impossible since the product of the values of the nine observables computed as the product of row 
1 with row 2 and row 3 is +1 while the same product computed with the columns is -1. 
An important remark is that in this proof it is assumed that each observable has a value in an individual 
system independently of how that value is measured and of which other commuting observables are 
                                                          
7 Indeed, if A and B commute, the observable C = A+B commute also with A and B and from C-A-B=0 one draws v(C)-v(A)-v(B)=0. 
8 Von Neumann assumed this condition because quantum mechanics requires that for any state |𝛹𝛹⟩,  ⟨𝛹𝛹|𝐴𝐴 + 𝐵𝐵|𝛹𝛹⟩ = ⟨𝛹𝛹|𝐴𝐴|𝛹𝛹⟩ + ⟨𝛹𝛹|𝐵𝐵|𝛹𝛹⟩. 
But of course, when A and B do not commute, this is true only in the average. So von Neumann’s assumption means demanding that a relation 
holds in the mean by imposing it case by case. An assumption that Bell even qualified as silly. 
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measured simultaneously. This condition is referred to as noncontextuality. So this is a proof that a 
hidden variables theory in agreement with quantum mechanics cannot be noncontextual9. 
We will see later that another Bell theorem proves that any theory reproducing the results of quantum 
mechanics must be non-local. Hence, a successful hidden variables theory must be contextual and non-
local. The most famous example of such a theory is the Bohm theory [16] in which the measurement 
problem does not exist. Bohm theory fully respects CQFA. Bohm postulates beside the usual wave 
function an actual configuration through the positions qi of the particles which evolves through a guiding 
equation: 
𝑑𝑑𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= ℏ
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
Ψ∗∇𝑖𝑖Ψ
Ψ∗Ψ
      (7) 
At any moment the particles have a definite position that exists even when unobserved and they follow 
a definite trajectory. The evolution of the wave function is still given by the Schrödinger equation. In 
order to reproduce the usual quantum predictions, the initial distribution of positions must satisfy the 
Born rule given by |Ψ|2. It is possible to show that, due to the dynamic described by the guiding 
equation, when a particle interacts with a macroscopic apparatus, the latter is in a unique position at the 
end of the interaction. Indeed, the global wave function evolves into a superposition of states that remain 
separated in the configuration space. Hence the configuration stays inside a unique component of the 
wave function, as if a collapse had occurred.  There is no more need for a reduction postulate and the 
measurement problem is dissolved. This is undoubtedly a great success of this theory.  
3.1.3. Modifying Schrödinger equation 
The Schrödinger equation being linear and describing a deterministic and unitary evolution cannot give 
a probabilistic reduction of the state vector. Hence it is natural to try modifying the Schrödinger equation 
in a way that allows getting a reduction when a measurement is done but preserving of course the current 
predictions when no measurement is made. The most famous attempt in this direction has been done by 
Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW theory) [17] who add stochastic and nonlinear terms in the 
Schrödinger equation. The wave function is subjected at random times to a spontaneous localization in 
space and the frequency of this localization increases with the number of constituents of the system. 
When the parameters of this process are well tuned, this allows macroscopic systems to be well localized 
without changing the usual quantum predictions for micro systems. Actually this is not exactly true since 
GRW theory makes some predictions that disagree with the predictions of quantum mechanics even 
though only in a presently non-testable manner [18]. This is the reason why GRW theory, even 
contradicting quantum mechanics on some points, is not eliminated by invoking CQFA. Perhaps future 
experiments will decide in favor of GRW theory or will falsify it. Nevertheless what is interesting is 
that, at least in principle, GRW theory is a rival theory for quantum mechanics. 
3.1.4. Are these modifications acceptable? 
We will not discuss here in details if the modifications of quantum mechanics through GRW theory or 
Bohm theory are acceptable or not and what is the price to pay for switching from the standard quantum 
theory to these other theories. Let’s just say first that building relativistic versions of these theories is 
difficult even if recent developments seem to indicate that it is possible in both cases10.  Moreover each 
one of these theories suffers from some unsatisfactory points. GRW theory explains the reduction 
                                                          
9 The usual presentation of contextuality is given through the observables of a spin 1 particle. The observable S2 which is the sum of the square 
of the components of the spin along any three orthogonal directions is equal to 2. Since the unsquared components have eigenvalues equal to 
-1, 0 or 1, that implies that one must be equal to 0. It is then possible to show that it is impossible to assign a value to one spin component 
without deciding which the orthogonal directions are [15]. 
10 See [19] for Bohm theory and [20, 21] for GRW theory. 
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through a mechanism that seems truly ad hoc. What is the reason for these spontaneous random 
localizations? There is none. They must be accepted as they are. Moreover, the parameters of the random 
localizations are tuned by hand in order to fit with the microscopic observations. This is of course not 
enough to reject the theory but this is not very satisfying.  Bohm theory was initially intended to restore 
the intuitive representation of the particles and their trajectories whereas quantum mechanics forbids to 
speak about them. But it appears that the picture that is given by the theory is far from allowing to come 
back to a simple realism similar to the one we can assume in classical physics. The first point is of course 
that the theory is contextual and non-local, but this is unavoidable due to BKS theorem and to the 
violation of Bell’s inequalities (as will be discussed In §5).  That means that the value of an observable 
cannot be considered as belonging directly to the system itself but depends also on the experimental set 
up that is used to measure it. In particular, measuring an observable A along with the two observables 
B and C (where A, B and C are mutually commuting) will not yield the same value for A than measuring 
it along with two other observables B’ and C’ (where A, B’ and C’ are also mutually commuting). Even 
worst, the value measured for A on one particle will possibly depend instantaneously on what is 
measured for B on another particle even if the second measurement is made very far from the first one. 
These features are unavoidable and common to every theory that preserves the predictions of quantum 
mechanics. So, it is hard to blame Bohm theory for that but it removes a large part of its initial appeal. 
Another point is that even if each particle follows a trajectory, this trajectory is unobservable since the 
very fact of observing it requires to use an experimental set up which changes the quantum potential 
which guides the particle and hence the trajectory. This is totally different from the case of classical 
trajectories which are observable without modifying them, at least in principle. So Bohm theory fails to 
help us recovering an intuitive realist vision which nevertheless was its initial motivation. Moreover the 
fact that the initial distribution of positions must satisfy the Born rule given by |Ψ|2 can be considered 
as a very strong assumption. 
The question of deciding if either of these theories should be accepted is left open11. In the following of 
this paper, I will assume that we fully accept the standard quantum formalism as a framework for the 
discussion12. 
 
3.2. Bohr’s position and the Copenhagen interpretation 
The Copenhagen interpretation is mainly due to Bohr13 with major contributions from Heisenberg14 and 
Born. Before the article15 of Einstein, Podolski, Rosen in 1935 [24] (hereafter EPR paper), Bohr's view 
was that observing a quantum object involves an uncontrollable physical interaction with a classical 
measuring device that affects both systems. This interaction produces an uncontrollable effect and that 
is the reason why the result of the measurement can only be predicted statistically. This effect cannot be 
neglected because the quantum of action is not null. When the position of an electron is measured, the 
apparatus and the electron interact in an uncontrollable way, and it becomes impossible to measure the 
momentum of the electron at the same time. A pictorial representation of this idea was given by 
Heisenberg in a thought experiment called Heisenberg's microscope [25]. That is the essence of the 
concept of complementarity: the measurement of the position of a system affects its momentum 
uncontrollably. Thus it is not possible to determine precisely both position and momentum. 
                                                          
11 See [22] for an open discussion between several physicists on the reasons to accept or to reject Bohm theory. 
12 Of course, this choice is not neutral for the philosophical discussion and we have to make clear that the conclusions that we will get could 
be put in question in the case where either of these theories are proved to escape all the objections that today prevent from considering that it 
is the “best” theory according to its empirical predictions, to its fruitfulness and to its adequacy with our preexisting philosophical requirements 
(which is probably the most problematic aspect).  
13 See [23] for an extended description of Bohr’s position. 
14 Actually, Bohr and Heisenberg were not in total agreement. Heisenberg’s position was considered as too subjective by Bohr. 
15 See below §4 for a detailed presentation of the EPR Paradox. 
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Complementarity helps understanding the Heisenberg uncertainty relations and is also the source of the 
statistical character of the quantum predictions. After the EPR paper, Bohr’s position evolved into a 
more radical departure from the vision that microscopic systems were classical objects possessing 
definite properties (such as it is depicted in Heisenberg’s microscope experiment). He started to say that 
a measurement is an interaction between the system and a macroscopic classical apparatus and that the 
property that is measured belongs not to the system itself but to the whole composed of the system plus 
the apparatus. He even went so far as saying that the very meaning of a property depends on the 
experimental set up that is used and that speaking about a property of a system without making reference 
to the apparatus that is used for measuring this property is meaningless. In the following, we will focus 
on this mature version of Bohr’s ideas which is often considered by physicists not willing to be involved 
in philosophical difficulties to eliminate all the problems of interpretation of quantum mechanics. For 
them, since a physicist using a macroscopic apparatus for measuring a physical property on a system 
perfectly knows what he is doing, there is no ambiguity and the reduction postulate must be applied. So, 
there is no more problem. Even if this point of view is perfectly working in practice from an 
instrumentalist standpoint, it leaves open the question of knowing what a macroscopic apparatus is. The 
distinction micro / macro is not a sharp one and assuming naively that a macroscopic system behaves 
classically is problematic since we know of many macroscopic systems showing a quantum behavior 
(super conductivity, super fluidity etc.). Another difficulty with this view is that the quantum formalism 
is assumed to be universally valid and it should be applied to any physical system, whether microscopic 
or macroscopic. But actually a more careful analysis of Bohr’s position shows nevertheless that what he 
had in mind was not that the classical behavior of the apparatus was directly linked to its macroscopic 
aspect but that it was linked to the use that the observer wanted to make of it. Bohr had in mind pragmatic 
reasons. If the observer wants to make a measurement on the apparatus through another apparatus, it has 
a quantum behavior. If it is used to make an observation on another system, it has a classical behavior 
[7, 23, 26].  In this case, it is clear that the role of a human observer in the definition of the measurement 
process cannot be avoided and that this definition can hardly be considered as “strongly objective” in 
the sense that we mentioned in §2.3.  What is clear is that Bohr never explained precisely what a 
measurement is and left open the question of determining when a measurement happens except for the 
case when a human observer knows that he is doing one. But he never explicitly gave this definition and 
avoided to be involved in mentioning the concept of consciousness. So, even if it contains many 
profound features, Bohr’s position can hardly be considered as the definitive solution to the 
measurement problem.  
 
3.3. Interpretation involving the consciousness of the observer 
Faced to the difficulty to avoid mentioning consciousness during the measurement process, some authors 
considered that even if the quantum formalism has a physical universal validity, the consciousness of 
the observer lies outside of its scope. As von Neumann says [4]: 
“Experience only asserts something like: an observer has made a certain (subjective) perception, but 
never such as: a certain physical quantity has a certain value.” 
“It is inherently entirely correct that the measurement or the related process of the subjective perception 
is a new entity relative to the physical environment and is not reducible to the latter.” 
“But in any case, no matter how far we calculate, [….], at some time we must say: and this is perceived 
by the observer. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts, the one being the observed 
system, the other the observer.” 
Wigner adds [27]: 
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 “When is the measurement completed? We will see that […] the measurement is completed only when 
we have observed its outcome” 
More precisely, according to their view, a measurement is made only when the consciousness of an 
observer has an interaction with a system. This interaction between the system and the consciousness of 
the observer has the physical effect to change the state of the system and to project it according to the 
reduction postulate. This is the position stated by Wigner [28] and by London and Bauer [29]. As we 
will see, these authors got a correct intuition about the fact that consciousness cannot be eliminated from 
the measurement process and that it is impossible to give a strongly objective definition of what a 
measurement is in quantum mechanics. But from this correct premise they draw a wrong conclusion. 
Assuming that, lying outside of the field of the physical entities obeying quantum mechanics, 
consciousness has nevertheless a physical action on the state of the entities inside this field is altogether 
shocking and incoherent. Of course, their position received a wide opposition from a majority of 
physicists not satisfied by this renaissance of the old Cartesian dualism. In Convivial Solipsism, 
consciousness plays also an essential role but does not interact with systems in a physical sense. 
 
3.4. Interpretations considering the vector states as relative 
I present in the following three interpretations that share the feature that the vector states are no more 
absolute but relative. Of course, the way they are relative and to what they are relative differ from one 
interpretation to the other. But this is as well an important feature of Convivial Solipsism and I need to 
clarify the similarities and differences between the way this relativity is used in these interpretations and 
in Convivial Solipsism. 
 
3.4.1. Everett’s interpretation 
Everett was worried by the measurement problem that he was seeing as a fundamental inconsistency of 
the standard collapse formulation of the quantum mechanics given by von Neumann [30]. He noticed 
that in the Copenhagen interpretation of the standard theory, the observer must be treated as an external 
system and that this prevents the universe to be described as a whole. He proposed [31, 32] a relative-
state formulation of pure wave mechanics without reduction. In his interpretation, there is no collapse 
and the universal wave function (observers included) evolves uniquely under the Schrödinger equation. 
Actually, there are several ways to understand Everett’s interpretation16 and I’ll present here only 
Everett’s own one and the one given by Graham and De Witt [33] usually called the “many-worlds 
interpretation” that is the way the majority of physicists understand Everett’s interpretation even though 
it was not supported by Everett. 
Everett was interested in giving a coherent explanation of the Wigner’s friend problem [6]. 
Let’s for example, consider the measurement by a friend of mine F of a system S with an apparatus A.  
Assume that S is a spin half particle in a superposed state along Oz. 
 |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧     (8) 
A is a Stern and Gerlach apparatus with a magnetic field oriented along 0z and F performs a 
measurement of the spin of S using A. After the interaction between my friend, the apparatus and the 
                                                          
16 In particular there is the so called “many-minds” version [34, 35] that I will not analyze here. 
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system, the Schrödinger equation gives the final entangled state17 for the whole system + apparatus + 
friend: 
 |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐹𝐹+� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐹𝐹−�    (9) 
Where  |↑� and  |↓� are the states of the apparatus with impact up (for spin up) and down (for spin down) 
and  |𝐹𝐹+� and  |𝐹𝐹−� are the states of the consciousness of my friend having seen a result “up” or “down”. 
If I include myself in the global state I get: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐹𝐹+� |� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐹𝐹−� |�   (10) 
Where  |� and  |� are my state of consciousness after having asked to my friend what she has seen 
and having received the answer “up” or “down”. 
Usually, the reduction postulates is used to insure that I will end either in the state |� or in the state |�. 
But if there is no collapse as Everett assumes, it is necessary to explain why I see a definite value and 
not a superposition. For Everett, observers are automatically functioning machines possessing recording 
devices (memory). The result of a measurement made by an observer is the state of her memory. Everett 
then makes a crucial distinction between absolute and relative states. For him, subsystems do not possess 
states that are independent of the states of the remainder of the system. If in this case, |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ can be 
considered as absolute because it concerns the whole system, while |� and  |� are relative because 
they concern only a part of the system.  
“Let one regard an observer as a subsystem of the composite system: observer + object-system. It is 
then an inescapable consequence that after the interaction has taken place there will not, generally, 
exist a single observer state. There will, however, be a superposition of the composite system states, 
each element of which contains a definite observer state and a definite relative object-system state. 
Furthermore, as we shall see, each of these relative object system states will be, approximately, the 
eigenstates of the observation corresponding to the value obtained by the observer which is described 
by the same element of the superposition. Thus, each element of the resulting superposition describes 
an observer who perceived a definite and generally different result, and to whom it appears that the 
object-system state has been transformed into the corresponding eigenstate.” [36]. 
So each relative memory state describes a relative observer with a determinate measurement. |� and  |� are then relative memory states of my consciousness describing different results. Everett insists on 
the fact that this in full agreement with our experience because no observer can be aware of the branching 
when it occurs. Now, an important and often forgotten point of his position is that Everett considers that 
all elements of a superposition must be regarded as simultaneously existing. In particular, that means 
that he thinks that it would always be possible in principle to put other branches in evidence through a 
measurement that would show interferences between them since the universal state vector remains 
superposed. The picture is then a unique universe described by a universal entangled state vector whose 
dynamics is entirely described by the Schrödinger equation and observers entangled also with the rest 
of the universe but having memory records corresponding to their relative states that are associated with 
experience of a definite result. Each observer has several different memory records (as many as possible 
results) but remains unique.  
The “many-worlds” interpretation (which is actually the most frequent way Everett’s interpretation is 
presented) gives a different picture. Graham and De Witt give the following description [33]: 
                                                          
17 In the following, we will often omit the symbol ⊗ for the tensorial product. 
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“By virtue of the temporal development of the dynamical variables the state vector decomposes naturally 
into orthogonal vectors, reflecting a continual splitting of the universe into a multitude of mutually 
unobservable but equally real worlds, in each of which every good measurement has yielded a definite 
result and in most of which the familiar statistical quantum laws hold.” 
So, if a measurement with a probabilistic outcome is made, the world splits into several worlds and each 
possible outcome of this measurement appears in some of these worlds in a proportion given by the 
quantum probability of that outcome. The main difference with Everett’s initial interpretation is that the 
universe is not made of a unique world but contains an exponentially growing number of worlds that are 
causally isolated and a corresponding growing number of clones of the initial observer each one 
inhabiting one world. No need to say that this version is not particularly economic from the ontological 
point of view. What is interesting is that it would be possible in principle to make a crucial experiment 
to decide between the two versions through an attempt to detect some interferences between branches, 
predicted by the first version and forbidden by the second one. The decoherence theory (see §7), 
correctly interpreted, works in favor of the initial version and not of the “many-worlds” one.  
Actually Vaidman [37, 38] defends a “many worlds” interpretation which is very close to the initial 
Everett position and not subject to the same criticism than Graham and De Witt’s one. The main 
difference is that in Everett's picture, worlds are relative to us and independent of our concepts while 
Vaidman prefers to define the concept of world relative to our concepts and independent from us, 
especially for helping discussion about times without observers (far past and far future). 
However, in all these versions, Everett’s interpretation faces two problems. The first one is the problem 
of the preferred basis (see below §7.3). But that could be solved by adding decoherence to it as we will 
see later. The second one is recovering the quantum statistics and Born rule in a sequence of 
measurement records. Attempts for that have been proposed but no general agreement has been 
reached18. Moreover it is not very satisfying to deal with so many consciousness for the same observer, 
which is the case in all versions. 
Everett’s interpretation can be read as a realist position even if the reality it describes is not very familiar. 
In both versions, the universe exists independently of any observer and is described by the universal 
state vector whose dynamics obeys the Schrödinger equation, is never reduced and remains entangled. 
Hence, this reality is not similar to the reality we are accustomed to. Observers are included in this 
universe as a part of it and their mental states are described by their relative states. What they see (which 
is not truly the reality since the universe remains in a superposed state) is however conform to the reality 
we are accustomed to. 
 
 
3.4.2. The relational interpretation 
The relational interpretation is due to Rovelli who denies that the state of a system is observer-
independent but, on the contrary, says that, similarly to what is the case in special relativity, a system 
has a state only relative to a given observer [41 - 43]. Moreover, for him, an “observer” is not 
mandatorily a human being but can be any physical system. So Rovelli belongs to the family of those 
who want to get a strongly objective formulation of quantum mechanics without any need of the concept 
of consciousness. An observer provides a frame of reference relative to which states and values can be 
assigned much in the same way that the speed of a system is relative to an inertial reference frame. He 
tries also to derive the formalism of the theory from a set of assumptions based on the concept of 
information. For him, quantum mechanics is a theory about information. In the following I will not 
                                                          
18 See for example Wallace [39] who claims having proved the Born rule in this context and Kent [40] who denies that it is the case. 
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address this second point19 and will focus mainly on the question to know if assuming that the state of 
a system is observer-dependent solves the puzzles of quantum mechanics as he claims or if this is not 
the case. I must say first that I am very sympathetic with the view that states and values are relative to a 
given observer. As we will see in the last part of this paper, Convivial Solipsism shares this particular 
feature and extends it even further. That’s the reason why, I will examine the relational interpretation in 
details. But, as we shall see, Convivial Solipsism departs from the relational interpretation in many 
respects mainly about what an observer and a measurement are. For Rovelli [41] any physical system 
can be an observer:  
 
“By using the word ‘observer’ I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in 
any other manner special, system. […] Velocity is a relational notion (… ) and thus it is always 
(explicitly or implicitly) referred to something; it is traditional to denote this something as the observer, 
but it is important to keep in mind that the observer can be a table lamp”.  
 
A table lamp is a macroscopic system but this is not even necessary and Rovelli insists on the fact that 
nothing distinguishes macroscopic systems from quantum systems.  
 
“If there is any hope of understanding how a system may behave as observer without renouncing the 
postulate that all systems are equivalent, then the same kind of processes –“collapse”– that happens 
between an electron and a CERN machine, may also happen between an electron and another electron”. 
 
Hence, an electron can play the role of an observer relative to another electron. In summary, from the 
“point of view” of any physical system (be it an electron) any interaction with another system is a 
measurement allowing the second system to possess some definite physical values relative to the first 
one, much in the same way that from the point of view of an inertial reference frame, a car has a definite 
speed. 
 
Rovelli exposes the (usual since von Neumann) two ways of describing a measurement process similarly 
to the presentation given above in §2.1. He considers an observer O (a classical measuring apparatus not 
necessarily including a human being) that makes a measurement on a system S. Assuming that the 
physical property q being measured takes two values 1 and 2 and that S is in an initial state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ =
α|1⟩ + β|2⟩, O measures either one of the two values 1 and 2 with respective probabilities |𝛼𝛼|2 and |𝛽𝛽|2. 
Assuming that the outcome of the measurement is 1, the initial S state is projected onto |1⟩. Rovelli then 
considers the same sequence of events from the point of view of a second observer P who describes the 
interacting system formed by S and O. P knows the initial states of both S and O but does not perform 
any measurement on the system S-O. Let’s say that O evolves to |𝑂𝑂1⟩ (resp |𝑂𝑂2⟩) when 1 (resp 2) is the 
outcome of the measurement made on S. Hence P assigns the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = α|1⟩ ⊗ |𝑂𝑂1⟩ + β|2⟩ ⊗ |𝑂𝑂2⟩ 
to the system S-O. Rovelli points to the fact that we have two descriptions of the same sequence of 
events, one given by the observer O, in which S is in the state |1⟩ and one given by the observer P, in 
which S is not in the state |1⟩. Usually the fact that these two descriptions are incompatible is considered 
as a problem (see §2.1) but Rovelli says that there is no problem since both descriptions are correct. 
There is no unique true description because according to him: 
“In quantum mechanics different observers may give different accounts of the same sequence of events”.  
                                                          
19 This point is interesting for the attempt to derive quantum formalism from simple assumptions but adds nothing to the discussion about the 
measurement problem since Rovelli’s solution for the puzzling problems of quantum mechanics is mainly contained inside this idea of 
observer-dependent state. 
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Is this position really solving the problem? The first objection is that Rovelli assumes that a measurement 
of q is made by O on S and that q has (for O) a definite value, say 1. But he doesn’t explain why the 
initial superposed state of S is projected onto one eigenvector of q. If, this is because a measurement has 
been performed on S by O, it is necessary to explain what a measurement is, what Rovelli does not. If 
O can be any physical system (what he claims) then it is difficult to understand why a simple interaction 
between O and S will have the result of projecting for O the superposed state of S onto one eigenvector, 
unless using a new ad hoc postulate, at least as embarrassing than the usual reduction postulate. It seems 
as if Rovelli postulated that any interaction between two physical systems (usually described as an 
entanglement between the two systems) has the consequence that from the point of view of the first one, 
the state of the second one is reduced (and vice versa). That seems strange to say the least. This postulate 
is much stronger than the usual reduction postulate. Of course, if we accept it, then the reduction 
postulate becomes a mere consequence. But why is the unitary evolution broken down (from the point 
of view of each system) during an interaction? According to Rovelli, the reason is because O does not 
have a full dynamical description of the interaction: 
 
“O cannot have a full description of the interaction of S with himself (O), because his information is 
correlation, and there is no meaning in being correlated with oneself”. 
 
Even if it is possible to concede that O does not know the Hamiltonian of interaction between O and S 
(but one can wonder what is the meaning of the sentence “O does not know something” when O is an 
electron!), that does not explain why a single definite outcome is selected for O during the interaction. 
Now, if Rovelli accepts the usual reduction postulate when a measurement is made, he must explain 
why a simple interaction between any two physical systems is a measurement. 
 
Moreover sometimes, Rovelli seems to confuse the fact a) that, following the interaction between S and 
O, there is a correlation between the state of S and the state of O (if S is in the state |1⟩ then O is in the 
state |𝑂𝑂1⟩  and if S is in the state |2⟩ then O is in the state |𝑂𝑂2⟩), with the fact b) that a measurement has 
been made (which means that S and O are in a definite eigenstate): 
 
“The fact that the pointer variable in O has information about S (has measured q) is expressed by the 
existence of a correlation between the q variable of S and the pointer variable of O. The existence of 
this correlation is a measurable property of the S-O state”. [41] 
 
But this correlation reflects merely the entanglement between the two systems while a measurement 
implies a reduction to only one of the two possibilities: either |𝑂𝑂1⟩|1⟩ or |𝑂𝑂2⟩|2⟩. Assimilating a 
correlation to a measurement seems difficult to accept20. And if it is not the case, one does not see why 
every interaction between two systems (even microscopic ones) should result in a measurement selecting 
one of the possible values.  
 
Besides that, the famous problem of the preferred basis (see §7.3) is not mentioned by Rovelli. Implicitly 
he assumes that the observer to which the state of the system is relative is the one that is correlated to 
the “good values” corresponding to macroscopic not superposed states.  His example of a measuring 
apparatus is misleading because it contains the implicit assumption that the only results that can be 
obtained are the eigenvalues of the observable that is measured. So far so good when the observer is a 
measuring apparatus designed to measure a specific observable. But Rovelli claims that the same 
                                                          
20 Rovelli claims nevertheless that the assumption that an observer is merely a physical system having got information (i.e. correlation) on 
another system lies at the heart of the relational interpretation [22]. 
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“measurement” situation can occur between two electrons. In this case, the second electron initially in 
a superposed state acquires a definite state relative to the first one. But what does that mean? Let’s 
consider two electrons U and V such that from the point of view of the observer P who does not make 
any measurement on the pair, they are in the singlet state. What is the state of the second electron relative 
to the first one? Which observable has been measured? The state of the pair relative to P is: |𝜓𝜓𝑃𝑃⟩ = 1√2 � |+�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 |−�𝑧𝑧𝑉𝑉 −  |−�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 |+�𝑧𝑧𝑉𝑉�     (11) 
According to the relational interpretation, the state of V relative to U can be either  |−�
𝑧𝑧
𝑉𝑉
 or  |+�
𝑧𝑧
𝑉𝑉
. But 
the singlet state is rotationally invariant and can be written under the same form whatever the direction 
of spin is chosen. So the state of V relative to U could also be  |−�
𝑥𝑥
𝑉𝑉
 or  |+�
𝑥𝑥
𝑉𝑉
. This is left unspecified by 
the relational interpretation. 
 
Rovelli insists also on the fact that the comparison between different views (of different observers) is 
always a physical interaction which is quantum mechanical in its essence.  
 
“Two observers can compare their information (their measurement outcomes) only by physically 
interacting with each other”. 
 
I fully agree with that. This is an essential feature that is shared by Convivial Solipsism. That is the 
reason why the consistency between the measurements of two different observers is preserved. If P asks 
a question to S concerning q and asks the same question to O (which can be done only by a measurement 
on S and a measurement on O), she will get consistent results. As Rovelli says [42]: 
 
“More precisely: everybody hears everybody else stating that they see the same elephant they see.” 
 
Asking if O and P have “really” the same information about S is meaningless because this question 
would have a meaning only relative to a third observer and as Bitbol [44] correctly notices, there is no 
meta-observer able to witness neutrally what the other observers “really” see, so there is no way to 
compare what they have seen in the absolute. Hence it is important to stress the following point: does 
the agreement between O and P when P asks to O which result she has got, mean that if O has seen 1, 
then P will get the answer 1? What we have in mind if we think that it should be the case, is that at the 
end, the system S will be in the state |1⟩, O in the state |𝑂𝑂1⟩ and P in the state |𝑃𝑃1⟩. In Rovelli’s words, 
if I hear you telling me that you see an elephant, then you really see an elephant and not a tiger. 
 
But this is not true for two reasons: the first one is that accordingly to the relational interpretation, we 
should not forget that there is no meaning speaking of a state without mentioning the observer to which 
it is related. So the correct way to express this idea inside the relational interpretation is that after the 
interaction between O and S, S is in the state |1⟩ relative to O and S+O is in the state  |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ =
α|1⟩|𝑂𝑂1⟩ + β|2⟩|𝑂𝑂2⟩ relative to P. Then P asks the question to O. Now according to the state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩, P 
can get either the answer 1 or the answer 2. Let’s assume that she gets the answer 2. Then for her, the 
state of S+O becomes |2⟩|𝑂𝑂2⟩. Hence if she measures S, she will of course find a consistent result and 
will find the system S in the state |2⟩ even if for O, S is in the state |1⟩. That is the real meaning of the 
fact that there can be no disagreement between O and P.  
 
The second reason is the point noticed above, that this sort of description is given from the point of view 
of a meta-observer which does not exist (a standpoint from nowhere) and so this way of understanding 
the situation is misleading. The fact is that there is no meaning of speaking in the absolute of what O 
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and P have seen separately and to be surprised that they may have not seen the same thing. The accounts 
from O and P should not be juxtaposed. This point has been clearly developed by Van Fraassen [45] and 
Brown [46]. This is an unavoidable feature that will also be the case in Convivial Solipsism. 
 
Einstein’s standpoint was a realist one. Relativity is clearly compatible with the existence of an external 
independent reality and the relational interpretation is also compatible with an external reality even 
though this reality is relative to each system. 
 
 
The main problem with the relational interpretation is that Rovelli assumes that any interaction between 
any two physical systems (even microscopic ones) is a measurement leading to the collapse of the state 
of the second one relatively to the first one (and vice versa). So doing, he thinks eliminating the need to 
include mind or consciousness inside his ontology. For him, we, as any other system, see a definite value 
when we have interacted with a system in such a way that a correlation has occurred between some 
eigenstates of one observable of the system and some definite states of us. But which states? Eigenstates 
of our own pointer observable? We have seen that the way the collapse occurs is not fully determined 
(e.g. the example of a singlet state). That faces the problem of the preferred basis that we’ll examine in 
§7.3. Moreover, accepting that such a collapse occurs at any interaction giving birth to correlations is 
difficult to swallow and is even more puzzling than accepting the usual reduction postulate in case of a 
measurement. Even if this collapse is relative to the particular system having interacted and not absolute, 
does it occur really in the external reality of this particular system? If one of the systems is a conscious 
observer doing a measurement on a particle, does this collapse occur really (in the reality relative to the 
observer) for the particle that is measured and does it change its physical state? If not, what does that 
mean? If yes, what is the physical process leading to this projection of a superposed state onto a definite 
state?  Rovelli, faithful to the way Einstein showed that properties such that positions and speeds are 
relative to a framework and willing to extend that to quantum properties, could reply that in special 
relativity, the speed of a system has no definite value if we do not specify a framework. He could add 
that, relative to one framework, the speed acquires one definite value without any need of a physical 
process explaining this “reduction”. Hence he could argue that the fact that the spin of an electron is 
determined relative to a system once we have specified this system (having interacted with the electron) 
is similar and does not require any further explanation. But this is unacceptable since the situation is 
totally different in quantum physics: for example, the fact that a system has a speed that is undefined if 
no framework is specified does not lead to any interference between the “possible speeds” while in 
quantum mechanics there are interferences which could be observed between the different possible 
states of spin. The indefiniteness of the speed in the absence of a specified framework is not at all 
comparable to the superposition of undefined quantum properties. That is the limit of the parallel that 
Rovelli wants to use between special relativity and quantum mechanics.  
 
Any attempt to give an interpretation free from the concept of conscious observer must nevertheless be 
able to explain why we (conscious observers) see what we see. Classical physics does that through the 
implicit assumption of a physical realism having the trivial consequence that if the world is “like that” 
independently of us then we see it “like that”. As we have seen, quantum mechanics forbids to make 
such an assumption. Hence, it is necessary for any interpretation to explain how what it describes results 
in what we see. The entangled state in which we are (with the system, the apparatus and the environment) 
provides indeed correlations but is not interpretable as a state in which we see definite values for speed 
or position (unless we adopt the Everett interpretation). So, even if the reality is not absolute but relative 
to each of us, why do we see our own reality as if it was classical? Rovelli’s interpretation has nothing 
to answer.  
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We will see later that even if it cannot be considered as providing a complete solution to the 
measurement problem, the theory of decoherence gives a satisfying explanation of why we never see 
macroscopic superpositions and why the pointer basis is emerging as the preferred basis. But Rovelli 
does not appeal to this theory. 
 
 
3.4.3. The Quantum Bayesianism: QBism 
QBism21 is mainly supported by Caves, Fuchs, Schack and Mermin [47 - 50]. QBists think that the 
primitive concept of experience is the central subject of science. This seems similar to Bohr’s position 
who insisted on saying that experiments were the basic subject of quantum mechanics but what Bohr 
had in mind was the classical reading of a macroscopic apparatus while for QBism, “experience” is 
much more than that. The word “experience” must be understood here as “personal experience”, 
meaning for each agent what the world has induced in her throughout the course of her life. Experience 
is the way in which the world impinges on any agent and how the agent impinges on the world. It is 
partly an instrumentalist position since, for QBists, quantum mechanics is but a tool allowing any agent 
to compute her probabilistic expectations for her future experience from the knowledge of the results of 
her past experience. QBists adopt the subjective interpretation of probability22 according to which 
probabilities are representing the degree of belief of an agent and, hence, are particular to that agent. 
This is an important point to notice: as they say, it is a “single user theory”. That means that: 
“Probability assignments express the beliefs of the agent who makes them, and refer to that same agent’s 
expectations for her subsequent experiences” [50]. 
QBism shares with the relational interpretation and Convivial Solipsism the feature that the entities of 
the formalism (wave functions, probabilities) have no absolute value (are not necessarily the same for 
all the observers) but are relative to a particular system (a particular agent for QBism, a particular 
physical system for the relational interpretation, a particular conscious observer for Convivial 
Solipsism). QBists refuse the idea that the quantum state of a system is an objective property of that 
system. It is only a tool for assigning a subjective probability to the agent’s future experience.  So 
quantum mechanics does not directly say something about the “external world”.  
“But quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world; it deals with the 
experiences of that objective world that belong to whatever particular agent is making use of the 
quantum theory.” [50]. 
A measurement (in the usual sense) is just a special case of what QBism calls experience and that is any 
action done by any agent on her external world. The result of the measurement is the experience that the 
agent gets from her action on her personal world. In this sense, measurements are made continuously by 
every agent. A measurement does not reveal a pre-existing state of affairs but creates a result for the 
agent. The goal of quantum formalism is only to give recipes to allow agents to compute their personal 
degree of belief about what will happen if they do such or such experience. The way QBists solve the 
measurement problem is very simple: they assume from the beginning that the direct internal awareness 
of her private experience is the only phenomenon accessible to an agent which she does not model with 
quantum mechanics and that the agent’s awareness is the result of the experiment. Hence, there is no 
more ambiguity about when using the reduction postulate which does not say anything about the “real 
                                                          
21 I will not address here the part of QBism aiming at reconstructing the quantum formalism from symmetric informationally complete positive-
operator-valued measure (SIC) which is not relevant for the present discussion. 
22 The subjective interpretation of probability has been mainly developed by de Finetti and Savage. It amounts to say that probabilities are 
related to an epistemic (hence personal and subjective) uncertainty and represent the degree of belief of an agent for the happening of an event. 
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state” of the system that is measured but is nothing else than the updating of the agent’s state assignment 
on the basis of her experience. In this respect, QBism is much clearer about what a measurement is than 
the relational interpretation which is dumb about that. In particular, there is no measurement when there 
is no agent: a Stern and Gerlach apparatus cannot measure by itself the spin of a particle. That is a very 
important point and we will see that Convivial Solipsism assumes something that is similar. QBists want 
to stress the fact that they depart from the standard Copenhagen interpretation in that a measurement is 
not “an interaction between classical and quantum objects occurring apart from and independently of 
any observer” [49]. They quote here the Landau and Lifshitz formulation of the Copenhagen 
interpretation. To be fair, this quotation is not really faithful to Bohr’s position which is more subtle as 
we have seen. But it is true that even when it is taken in all its subtlety, Bohr’s position is not able to 
solve the measurement problem in a satisfying way as we have seen since it does not make any explicit 
resort to the observer to define a measurement while simultaneously it appeals to the use that is done of 
the apparatus.  
For QBism, any agent can use the quantum formalism to model any system external to herself whether 
they be atoms, apparatuses or even other agents. For any agent, the personal internal awareness of other 
agents is inaccessible and not something she can apply quantum mechanics to. But the communication 
with other agents (verbal exchanges for example) is. That means that an agent can use a description of 
another agent through a superposed state encoding her probabilities for the possible answers to any 
question she might ask before getting a definite answer. This is very similar to the description we gave 
about the relation interpretation. A consequence is that it seems that reality can differ from an agent to 
another. But the same reservations as for the relational interpretation can be made about the meaning of 
the comparison between the perceptions of two agents since this comparison could only be done from a 
meta observer point of view, which does not exist. No third person point of view is allowed. 
We will see that Convivial Solipsism shares many features with QBism, the most important one being 
the fundamental role that the observer plays in the measurement process and the relinquishment of any 
absolute description of the world. Now QBism is fuzzy on many aspects and leaves open many important 
questions whose answers would be necessary if one wants to get a detailed precise picture of what is 
going on. I give below a list of questions that naturally arise when one tries to go beyond a superficial 
understanding which at first sight seems satisfying but which raises many issues at second sight when 
one tries to understand more precisely what QBism means. 
The first one is to clarify what it is that makes “something” an agent. According to QBists, an agent 
must have experience. Does that mean that an agent must be conscious? That is something that they are 
reluctant to accept. Nevertheless, they admit that experience and consciousness are difficult to 
disentangle23. But, they say that consciousness is not necessary for QBism and that experience is all is 
needed. However they admit that a computer programmed to use quantum mechanics would not be an 
agent and that the only agents known today are human beings… Acknowledging that an agent must be 
conscious to have experience while simultaneously refusing to discuss consciousness (which is not 
exactly the same concept than experience) on the basis that experience is enough and that the slight 
conceptual difference between consciousness and experience is irrelevant to quantum physics would be 
a perfectly acceptable position if it did not just so happen that the difference is relevant because it helps 
understanding some of the questions below. 
The QBist solution to the measurement problem is that through her interaction with the external world, 
the agent has an experience which is the result of the measurement. There seems to remain no more 
ambiguity about what a measurement is since there is no measurement without agent. Once admitted 
                                                          
23 Private communication. 
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that an agent creates a result through her experience, it becomes acceptable to claim that the role of 
quantum mechanics is only to give rules allowing the agent to update her old beliefs with the result she 
got and from that, to compute her new beliefs about future experience.  But now the big question is: how 
is it possible for an agent to create a result? Where this result does come from? Is it something that can 
be described by the quantum formalism (independently of the fact that of course we all know what it is 
to have experience)? QBism seems to take the fact that the agent gets a unique (and classical) result as 
a basic given fact and does not make any attempt to give an explanation of it. Claiming that quantum 
mechanics is only a list of recipes for any agent to compute her beliefs for her future experience from 
her old beliefs updated by new results would be acceptable if precisely one of the main problem in 
quantum mechanics was not to explain how one unique result is obtained. Classical probability theory 
(whether Bayesian or not) can be viewed as a list of recipes to compute the probability of some well-
defined events that are not explained themselves by probability theory. Probability theory is not expected 
to explain why a coin can land head or tail. The fact that a coin lands head or tail is taken as an external 
fact and when one such event happens, it allows updating the previous series of tosses if the user is 
willing to use it to modify her belief about the fact that the coin is biased or not. The situation for 
quantum mechanics is totally different since it is supposed to be a universal theory that must explain 
how a result is obtained during a measurement. But QBism gives no reason for that. Moreover no 
reference is made to the decoherence process for explaining that the result we get is conform to what we 
want to measure (preferred basis problem) and that we do not see macroscopic superpositions. This is 
just something that is accepted as such. QBism claims to have no need of decoherence [48]: 
“For QBism, it is not the emergence of classicality that needs to be explained, but the emergence of our 
new ways of manipulating, controlling, and interacting with matter that do.” 
All that could be acceptable for a strongly instrumentalist position, claiming that the fact that a unique 
classical result is obtained is something that is just taken as a given fact (about which it has nothing to 
say) and that quantum mechanics is not a universal theory of the universe but is limited to the 
computation of beliefs about future experiments. In this case, QBism would loss a great part of its 
interest. But QBism puts at the center of its thesis the concept of experience of agents and it should be 
committed to answer all the questions that this concept raises. As far as classical subjective probabilities 
are concerned, the agent updates her assignment because she learns something new about the external 
world and what she learns is considered as real and independent of the agent. In QBism how does that 
happen?  
“A measurement does not, as the term unfortunately suggests, reveal a pre-existing state of affairs. It is 
an action on the world by an agent that results in the creation of an outcome.” [50]. 
Hence it seems that QBists endorse the idea that there is an external world on which each agent can act 
and that this action modifies the external world and creates a result which is her experience (her own 
private world). So QBists give the beginning of an explanation of how a result is obtained by an agent. 
Hence, they cannot refuse to go further in this explanation. The status of this external world is not clear. 
Is the external world one unique external world common to all the agents or has each agent her own 
external world in addition to her own personal world that she builds from her interactions with the 
external world?  
If it is assumed that there is a unique external world as seems to indicate Fuchs when he says [48]: 
“… the real world, the one both are embedded in –with its objects and events – is taken for granted. 
What is not taken for granted is each agent’s access to the part of it he has not touched” 
then a question arises about what happens in this external world when a measurement is made by an 
agent. The interaction between an agent and the external world has a special status since it is assumed 
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to be out of the scope of quantum mechanics (that is the very reason why the measurement problem is 
solved). Is this interaction a physical interaction? If yes, is the external world changed? How? Why is 
the agent getting a unique result? The result participates to the construction of the agent’s personal 
world. But is this result to be interpreted as real in the external world?  If yes, it seems that we are back 
to the position of London and Bauer with a process that can have a physical impact on the world while 
resting outside of the scope of quantum mechanics. If on the contrary, the result is supposed to be only 
in the mind of the agent and the physical system is unaffected, then we arrive to something that is very 
similar to Convivial Solipsism except that, as we noticed, QBism is unable to explain why interferences 
between the different initial components of the state vector (which remains superposed) are not observed 
after the agent got a result while the system is physically unaffected. This is precisely what Convivial 
Solipsism explains. 
Now, if each agent has her own external world, what is the difference between her external world and 
her personal world? Are the properties of a system seen by an agent real properties of the system inside 
the external world? It seems that it is not the case but what are they? Moreover, assume that Alice makes 
a measurement (say of the spin along Oz of an electron) and creates one result for her (say +) through 
her action on the world. Bob keeps a superposed state vector for the electron (and also for Alice who is 
entangled with the electron after the measurement) allowing him to compute the probability for getting 
+ or – if he makes a measurement. But it is perfectly possible that Bob gets the result -. Even if we fall 
here in the trap that we denounced above of adopting a meta observer point of view in comparing the 
results got by Alice and Bob, it seems that each agent creates the values that she sees for each property 
of each system. The picture becomes that of separated worlds each one attached to one agent who acts 
on her own world to create what she sees. That could be not so far from Convivial Solipsism. 
Even though, as we have seen, that would not be coherent to start mentioning these points and to refuse 
to take into consideration all the questions that these points raise, QBists could adopt an extreme 
instrumentalist position and answer that they are not interested in answering these questions. In this 
case, QBism would at least have the merit to claim that it is impossible to understand what science is 
(especially quantum mechanics but not only) without taking into account that ultimately, all what 
science describes is our personal experience. It also gives a clear prescription of how to use the recipes 
of quantum mechanics ascribing to use the reduction postulate only when an agent is involved. But this 
limited position is not really satisfying and QBism should aim at more.  
At this stage, I do not pretend that there is any contradiction in the description given by QBism but only 
that all these points should be made clear in order to be able to get a global coherent picture of the 
ontology of QBism. All the above questions can find some kind of answer if consciousness is taken into 
consideration. The puzzling question about the creation of a result from the interaction between the 
agent and the external world (unacceptable if understood in a physical sense) and the nature of the 
construction of the personal world from the external world find natural explanations in Convivial 
Solipsism which is much more explicit on these points, as I will show in §8. 
 
4. The EPR Paradox  
It is well known that the initial Einstein, Podolski, Rosen paper [24] was aimed at proving that quantum 
mechanics is not complete. They first state the now famous Criterion of Reality: 
“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal 
to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding to that 
quantity.” 
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Then they propose a thought experiment in which two quantum systems interact in such a way that two 
conservation laws hold, the relative position along the x-axis and the total linear momentum along that 
same axis which is always zero. They then say that measuring the position of the first system allows to 
predict with probability one the position of the second one. According to the Criterion of Reality, that 
means that the predicted position is an element of reality for the second system. The same reasoning is 
possible if this is the momentum of the first system that is measured. Hence, both position and 
momentum are elements of reality for the second system. This is in contradiction with quantum 
mechanics that claims, if it is complete, that there can be no simultaneously real values for incompatible 
quantities. To be correct, this demonstration needs nevertheless two additional postulates. The first one 
is separability: at the time when a measurement is made on the first system, the second system maintains 
its separate identity even though it is correlated with the first one. The second postulate is locality: at 
the time of measurement, the two systems no longer interact so no real change can take place in the 
second system as a consequence of a measurement made on the first one. As Fine puts it [51]: 
“In summary, the argument of EPR shows that if interacting systems satisfy separability and locality, 
then the description of systems provided by state vectors is not complete. This conclusion rests on a 
common interpretive principle, state vector reduction, and on the Criterion of Reality.” 
Of course, the EPR argument was widely discussed at the time in particular by Bohr. In substance, Bohr 
acknowledges the fact that the measurement of the first system does not involve any mechanical 
disturbance of the second system. But he claims that this measurement on the first system does involve 
“an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future 
behavior of the other system.” Now measuring the position of the first system does not allow any 
prediction for the momentum of the second system. Since, as we have seen, for Bohr the very meaning 
of a property depends on the experimental set up that is used, it is not possible to speak of the momentum 
as being an element of reality of the second system if the position is what is measured on the first one. 
Hence for him, the argument does not hold anymore. Since it is no more possible to consider that both 
observables are defined simultaneously, position and momentum cannot have definite values at the same 
time and quantum mechanics can again be considered as complete. A careful analysis shows 
nevertheless that if Bohr succeeds in refuting the incompleteness of quantum mechanics this is at the 
price to giving up either separability or locality. Indeed, claiming that it becomes possible to speak of 
the position of the second system only as soon as the position of the first one has been measured, as far 
as the two systems can be from each other, means either that the two systems are actually one unique 
system before this measurement or that the first one can have a sort of instantaneous action at a distance 
on the second one. 
It has become usual to state the EPR paradox not through the initial formulation with position and 
momentum as incompatible observables but through the formulation given by Bohm [52]. In Bohm’s 
formulation, a spin zero particles decays with spin conservation into two spin ½ particles U and V in the 
singlet state of spin. Such a state can be written as: |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1
√2
� |+�𝑈𝑈 |−�𝑉𝑉 −  |−�𝑈𝑈 |+�𝑉𝑉�     (12) 
Where  |+� and  |−� are the state corresponding to a spin +1/2 and -1/2 of the related particles along an 
arbitrary chosen axis. The main point is that this state is invariant by rotation and that the total spin of 
the two particles along any axis must be zero. Hence, if a measurement of the spin of the particle U 
along one arbitrary axis is “+” then a measure of the spin of the particle V along the same axis will have 
to give “-“. Now the same reasoning than the previous one with position and momentum in the initial 
formulation can be done. In this case, the incompatible observables are for example, the spin along 
x-axis and the spin along z-axis. Briefly stated, if a measurement of the spin along x-axis of U is made, 
this allows to predict with probability one the value of the spin along x-axis of V. Hence, according to 
EPR Criterion of Reality, the value of the spin along x-axis of V is an element of reality for V. As, this 
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can be done also for the measurement of the spin along z-axis of U, that means that the value of the spin 
along z-axis of V is also an element of reality for V. Hence, both the value of the spin along x-axis and 
the value of the spin along z-axis of V are simultaneous elements of reality for V. But, this is in 
contradiction with the fact that quantum mechanics is complete since according to the quantum 
formalism, the observable spin along x-axis and the observable spin along z-axis are not commuting and 
cannot have simultaneously well-defined values. 
Let’s first make clear that the situation is not similar to the classical situation where “things are done” 
when the two particles separate. Assuming that, would mean that the explanation for the fact that the 
value of the spin along z-axis of V is “-“ (resp. “+”) if the measurement of the spin along z-axis of U 
have given the result “+”  (resp. “-“) is simply the fact that as soon as U and V separate, the value of the 
spin along z-axis of U was already “+” (resp. “-“) and the value of the spin along z-axis of V was already 
“-“ (resp. “+”). That would mean that the state of U and V right after their separation is either |𝜓𝜓1⟩ = |+�
𝑧𝑧
𝑈𝑈 |−�
𝑧𝑧
𝑉𝑉
 or |𝜓𝜓2⟩ =  |−�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 |+�𝑧𝑧𝑉𝑉 . Now, if we consider a set of N pairs U and V, that means that this 
set is a mixture of N/2 pairs in the state |𝜓𝜓1⟩ and N/2 pairs in the state |𝜓𝜓2⟩. But this is in contradiction 
with the fact that the pairs are in the singlet state. Indeed, the predictions given by N systems in the 
singlet state and those given by this mixture are different as soon as another axis is considered. For 
example, the probability for finding the same spin “+” along x-axis  for U and V is ¼ in the case of the 
mixture while it is 0 in the case of the singlet state. This proves that it is not possible to consider that the 
value of the spin along any axis is already fixed as soon as U and V separate and before any 
measurement. It is only when a measurement is done on U along one particular axis that the value of the 
spin along this axis becomes defined.  
Now comes the striking point: if this is true, that means that the value of the spin of V along the same 
axis is also only determined when the measurement on U is done, whatever the distance between U and 
V be.  So a measurement of the spin of U along an axis R providing the result “+” has the effect of 
projecting the singlet state vector of the pair into a new state that is a tensorial product of two pure states 
corresponding to a definite value of the spin along this axis:   |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1
√2
� |+�𝑈𝑈 |−�𝑉𝑉 −  |−�𝑈𝑈 |+�𝑉𝑉� 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯�  |+�
𝑅𝑅
𝑈𝑈 |−�
𝑅𝑅
𝑉𝑉
   (13) 
So, the state vector of V becomes  |−�
𝑅𝑅
𝑉𝑉
 immediately after the measurement on U having given the result 
“+”. Hence, this measurement has three effects. It determines the value of the spin of U along the axis 
R, it separates U and V allowing each of them to possess its own state (which was not the case before 
because they were entangled) and it determines the value of the spin of V along the axis R. This 
measurement has then an influence on the state of V and this influence at a distance is instantaneous. I 
will discuss in more details this point later but it is useful from now to notice that this conclusion is 
embarrassing especially for those realists who assume that the state vector is representing a real state of 
the system, for a change in the state vector is, for them, a change in the real state of the system. Hence 
it seems that locality is violated in some respects even if no mechanical disturbance is involved and even 
if it can be shown that is not possible to transmit any information through this process. 
To be clear, let’s summarize the reasoning at this stage: either quantum mechanics is not complete 
because things are already determined before the measurement (which is a situation that it is not possible 
to describe inside the quantum formalism and that leads to assuming hidden variables) or there is a 
violation of locality. This violation is more or less serious depending on the level one is assuming a 
realist position and whether one interprets the state vector as representing a real state of the system or 
not. The EPR argument was only a thought experiment until Bell came. 
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5. Bell’s inequalities 
Bell shows [53] that, under a given set of assumptions, certain of the correlations that can be measured 
between the two systems in an EPR experiment must obey some inequalities. The interesting point is 
that quantum theory predicts that Bell’s inequalities must be violated. That means that quantum theory 
is inconsistent with the assumptions used to derive the inequalities.   
We will follow a very simple proof given by Maccone [54] which is useful for understanding what Bell’s 
inequalities mean without being involved into useless technical stuff. Let’s call “local theory” a theory 
where the outcome of an experiment on a system are independent of the actions performed on a different 
system that has no causal connection with the first. Let’s define as realist24 a theory where it is 
meaningful to assign a property to a system independently of whether the measurement of this property 
is carried out. Then quantum mechanics is either non local or non-realist.  
Let’s consider three arbitrary two valued properties A, B, C and two systems satisfying locality and 
realism for these properties. That means that the measurement of one of these properties on one system 
has no effect on the measurement of anyone of these properties on the other system and that it is 
meaningful to consider that each system has definite values for each one of these properties even if no 
measurement is made. That is exactly what the case is in classical physics. Let’s assume that the two 
systems are identical so that if the measurement of a property on the first one gives a certain result, it is 
sure that the measurement of the same property on the second one will yield the same result. Call 
Psame(A,B) the probability that the property A of the first system and the property B of the second system 
have the same value (both 0 or both 1). Then for identical systems, Psame(A,A)= Psame(B,B)= 
Psame(C,C)=1. Now it’s easy to show that: 
Psame(A,B) + Psame(A,C) + Psame(B,C) ≥ 1     (14) 
Maccone gives a graphical proof but that can be shown directly. We can rewrite the first member of the 
above equation as: 
Psame(A,B) + Psame(A,C) + Psame(B,C) = P(A=1, B=1, C=0) + P(A=1, B=1, C=1) + P(A=0, B=0, C=0) + 
P(A=0, B=0, C=1) + P(A=1, C=1, B=0) + P(A=1, C=1, B=1) +P(A=0, C=0, B=0) + P(A=0, C=0, B=1) 
+ P(B=1, C=1, A=0) + P(B=1, C=1, A=1)+ P(B=0, C=0, A=0) + P(B=0, C=0, A=1)  
= 1 + P(A=1, B=1, C=1) + P(A=0, B=0, C=0)+ P(A=0, C=0, B=0) + P(B=1, C=1, A=1) ≥ 1  
 (15) 
Of course, this supposes that the probabilities are defined on a set of events that obeys the standard 
Kolmogorov axioms of probability, That means that the three properties have simultaneously definite 
values on each systems and that these values are what they are independently of any measurement of 
them (what realism and locality imply). 
Now let’s show that this inequality can be violated in some cases in quantum mechanics. Consider two 
spin ½ systems in an entangled state:  |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1
√2
� |+�
𝑧𝑧
1 |+�
𝑧𝑧
2 +  |−�
𝑧𝑧
1 |−�
𝑧𝑧
2
�    (16) 
Let’s consider the three observables A, B and C defined as: A is the spin along the z-axis, B is the spin 
along an axis u got from a rotation of π/3 of the z-axis in the Oxz plane, C is the spin along an axis v 
got from a rotation of -π/3 of the z-axis in the Oxz plane. Then for each system: 
                                                          
24 Maccone is willing to avoid using the term “realist” because it is, according to him, too philosophically laden and he prefers using the term 
“counter-factual definite”. Here I will continue using the term ”realist” in the meaning of EPR criterion of reality. 
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 |+�
𝑢𝑢
= 12  |+�𝑧𝑧 + √32  |−�𝑧𝑧  |−�
𝑢𝑢
= √32  |+�𝑧𝑧 − 12  |−�𝑧𝑧 
(17) 
 |+�
𝑣𝑣
= 12  |+�𝑧𝑧 − √32  |−�𝑧𝑧  |−�
𝑣𝑣
= √32  |+�𝑧𝑧 + 12  |–�𝑧𝑧 
It can be checked that: |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1
√2
� |+�
𝑧𝑧
1 |+�
𝑧𝑧
2 +  |−�
𝑧𝑧
1 |−�
𝑧𝑧
2
� = 1
√2
� |+�
𝑢𝑢
1  |+�
𝑢𝑢
2 +  |−�
𝑢𝑢
1  |−�
𝑢𝑢
2
� = 1
√2
� |+�
𝑣𝑣
1  |+�
𝑣𝑣
2 +  |−�
𝑣𝑣
1  |−�
𝑣𝑣
2
�  (18) 
Assuming realism and locality, which means that the two systems have the same values for all properties 
since if a measurement of one property on one system gives a certain result, any measurement of the 
same property on the other system will give the same result. 
Now, computing for example Psame(A,B) can be done through rewriting |𝜓𝜓⟩ as: |𝜓𝜓⟩ = 1
2√2
� |+�
𝑧𝑧
1( |+�
𝑢𝑢
2 + √3 |−�
𝑢𝑢
2) +  |−�
𝑧𝑧
1( √3|+�
𝑢𝑢
2
−  |−�
𝑢𝑢
2)�  (19) 
It is easy to see that according to the Born rule, the probability to get + for both properties is 1/8 and the 
same for the probability to get –. So, the probability to get the same value is ¼. Similar computations 
show that it is the same for Psame(A,C) and Psame(B,C). Hence:  
Psame(A,B) + Psame(A,C) + Psame(B,C) = ¾ ≤ 1    (20) 
in contradiction Bell’s inequality. That means that quantum mechanics is incompatible with either 
realism or locality (or both).   
The simple form of Bell’s inequality we have presented here is not convenient to set up an experiment 
in order to test if the inequality is actually violated by quantum mechanics. Many different variant of 
Bell’s inequality have been derived. The most usual form for the experiments is the Bell-Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (BCHSH) inequality [55] and it concerns the polarization of photons. As is well known, 
even if it is always possible to question one or another subtle detail in each experiment to escape the 
conclusion, it is now widely agreed, after Aspect’s experiments, that the inequalities are violated and 
that the result given by quantum mechanics is the correct one [56, 57].   
What does that mean that no theory can respect both realism and locality? It is well known that the 
quantum mechanics formalism provides no way to describe the fact that incompatible observables (such 
as position and momentum or spin along two different axes) have simultaneously definite values. In this 
sense, quantum mechanics is not directly compatible with realism (at least understood according to the 
way presented above) and this is the reason why Einstein thought that it was not complete. But, it could 
be possible to imagine that it is possible to complete it with hidden variables which describe the “real” 
values possessed by the incompatible observables. That’s what Bohm theory does as we saw §3.1.2. But 
of course, in order to be empirically correct, this theory must give the same predictions than ordinary 
quantum mechanics (and this is actually the case). So Bell’s inequality is also violated in Bohm theory 
which means that locality is not respected (since realism seems to be25). More generally, any hidden 
                                                          
25 As we saw in §3.1.2, the kind of realism that Bohm theory respects is nevertheless very peculiar. 
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variables theory must be non-local. That means that even if incompatible properties can have 
simultaneously definite values independently of any measurement, any measurement of one observable 
on one system can possibly affect instantaneously the value of the corresponding observable on another 
distant entangled system. 
If we summarize, EPR argument shows that either quantum mechanics is not complete or it is not local. 
Bell’s inequality shows that any hidden variables theory must be non-local. Hence, non-locality seems 
unavoidable.  
We will nevertheless see that Convivial Solipsism allows quantum mechanics to be local even if it is at 
the price of reinterpreting the formalism in a rather radical way. 
 
6. Summary of the puzzling questions 
At this stage, many questions are puzzling: 
- What is a measurement and when must we use the Schrödinger equation or the reduction postulate for 
describing the evolution of systems? 
- When and why only one of the many possible results of measuring an observable is selected? 
- If the measurement does not reveal a preexisting value, how is it possible that this value be created 
during the measurement? 
- Does this value so created belong to the system itself, does it belong to the system and the apparatus, 
does it concern the external reality and if so, is this reality the same for all observers, or is the value 
something that concerns merely the observer? 
- If even macroscopic systems can become entangled, why don’t we observe macroscopic 
superpositions? 
- How do we know which observable is measured when we use an apparatus? (That is the preferred 
basis problem, see §7.3). 
- How must we understand the non-locality shown by Bell’s inequalities and is there any instantaneous 
action at a distance? 
Some of the interpretations we have seen above give different answers to some of these questions. But 
none gives answers to all these questions in a coherent way.  We are going to see that decoherence 
allows to answer the fifth and the sixth questions. Convivial Solipsism (which welcomes the 
decoherence mechanism) is an attempt to answer the others and to get a coherent general image even if 
the final picture it gives will perhaps appear a little weird to those attached to a more familiar view of 
reality. 
 
7. The decoherence mechanism 
I present here the decoherence mechanism that provides answers to some of the questions stated in §6. 
This solution came first from a remark from Zeh [58] that no system is really totally isolated. Hence it 
is necessary to take the environment into account. Then Zurek [59, 60] did the final move. The 
decoherence theory is nothing else than the description of the way to take the interaction between the 
system, the apparatus and the environment into account inside the quantum formalism. I shall first 
describe briefly the technical framework in which the decoherence theory is usually stated. Then I will 
explain how decoherence works and what it achieves (mainly selecting the preferred basis and 
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explaining why macroscopic superpositions are never seen). I will refute then the realist interpretation 
of decoherence that pretends that decoherence solves the measurement problem. 
  
7.1. The density matrix formalism 
The density matrix formalism has been invented for being able to deal with statistical mixtures of 
systems being in different pure states, as in classical statistical mechanics. The density matrix (which is 
actually an operator) of a system being in a pure state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ is: 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆|. For the sake of simplicity, 
we will consider a two dimensional Hilbert space26 with a basis (|𝜑𝜑1⟩,  |𝜑𝜑2�): 
Let |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |𝜑𝜑1� + 𝛽𝛽 |𝜑𝜑2� then the density matrix in this basis is: 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = �|𝛼𝛼|2 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽∗𝛼𝛼∗𝛽𝛽 |𝛽𝛽|2�       (21) 
In this case: 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆2 =  𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 and Tr(𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆2) = 1.  That means that for a pure state, the density operator is a 
projector. 
If we consider now a statistical mixture E of N systems in the state  |𝜑𝜑1� with probability p1 and in the 
state  |𝜑𝜑2� with probability p2 = 1-p1, the density matrix is: 
𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸 = �𝑝𝑝1 00 𝑝𝑝2�       (22) 
This density matrix is diagonal so that its form is analogous to the classical case of a statistical mixture 
of a proportion p1 of systems in the state  |𝜑𝜑1� and a proportion p2 of systems in the state |𝜑𝜑2�. 
In general, let’s consider a statistical mixture of N systems in the states |𝛹𝛹𝑘𝑘⟩ with probability  𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 |𝛹𝛹𝑘𝑘⟩ = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘  |𝜑𝜑1� + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  |𝜑𝜑2�      (23) 
Then 𝜚𝜚𝑘𝑘 = |𝛹𝛹𝑘𝑘⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑘𝑘|   and  𝜌𝜌 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘  𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 . In this case 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆2 ≠  𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆. An important point is that it is always 
possible to find a basis ( |ζ1�,  |ζ2�)  in which the density matrix is diagonal so that its form is analogous 
to the classical case of a statistical mixture of a proportion μ1 of systems in the state  |ζ1� and a proportion 
1- μ1 of systems in the state |ζ2�. 
In general, the diagonal element  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the probability to find the system in the state  |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ and the non-
diagonal element  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is linked to the interferences between |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ and �𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗�. 
The mean value of any observable A is given by ?̅?𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴) and the frequency with which the 
measurement of A will give the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘 is 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇[𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘)] where 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘) is the projector onto 
the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors of A corresponding to the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘. 
The Schrödinger equation gives: 
𝑖𝑖ℏ
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝜚𝜚(𝑡𝑡) = [𝐻𝐻(𝑡𝑡), 𝜚𝜚(𝑡𝑡)]     (24) 
Let’s now consider for example, an ensemble of N identical systems S each composed of two entangled 
subsystem U and V and let the state  
                                                          
26 Of course, all will be said here for a two-dimensional Hilber state is applicable for any other dimensional Hilbert space. 
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|𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖⟩𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�     (25) 
be the state vector of each S. The density matrix describing this ensemble is 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆|. Assume 
now that we are interested only in the ensemble of the subsystems V. It is well known that in this case 
it is not possible to assign a state vector to V. Only the composed system S has a state vector. Now the 
quantum formalism allows to compute for this ensemble a density matrix from which it is possible to 
compute the mean value of any observable A and the frequency with which the measurement of A will 
give each one of its eigenvalues, through exactly the same formula as the one given above provided that 
A is acting only in the subspace linked to V. The ensemble V, though without state vector can be 
described by a density matrix. This density matrix is got by a mathematical operation called the partial 
trace of the global density matrix 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆. This is a general procedure. When one is interested only in a 
subsystem of a composed global system, when one decides to restrict the measurements to observables 
that are related only to this subsystem, the density matrix that one must use is the partial trace of the 
global one. This will play a major role in the decoherence mechanism.  
One very important conceptual point about this mathematical operation of partial trace has been shown 
by d’Espagnat [61]. Let’s consider for example the density matrix of an ensemble E composed of N 
systems S of two spin ½ particles in the singlet state:   |𝜓𝜓⟩𝐸𝐸 = 1√2 � |+�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 |−�𝑧𝑧𝑉𝑉 −  |−�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 |+�𝑧𝑧𝑉𝑉�    (26) 
and 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸 = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆|. The density matrix of the ensemble EU composed only of the U particles is got form 
the partial trace of 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸: 
𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈 = 1√2 � |+�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈⟨+|𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈 +  |−�𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈⟨−|𝑧𝑧𝑈𝑈�    (27) 
It has the same form as the density matrix of a mixture of particles U having a spin + along Oz for half 
of them and a spin – for the other half. But it would be wrong to consider that it is actually the density 
matrix of a proper mixture of that kind. Indeed, assuming so (and the same for the V particles) would 
mean that the ensemble E is composed of a mixture of particles U and V having each a well-defined 
value of spin along Oz. Actually it would be composed for one half, of pairs of one particle U having a 
spin + along Oz and one particle V having a spin – along Oz and for the other half of pairs of one particle 
U having a spin - along Oz and one particle V having a spin + along Oz (the other combinations are 
impossible in the singlet state). But such a mixture, let’s call it E’, has a density matrix 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸′ that is 
different from 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸 and that would lead to predictions relative to the correlations of measurement of spin 
along other directions than Oz that would be different from the predictions made from 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸. For example 
a measurement of the spin of U and V along Ox, would get a probability 0 from 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸 for finding both spin 
equal to + while this probability would be ¼ from 𝜚𝜚𝐸𝐸′. 
This shows that even if the density matrix of a subsystem obtained as the partial trace of the density 
matrix of a global system has the same form as the density matrix of a proper mixture of systems being 
each in one well defined eigenstate of those entering in the composition of the global entangled state, it 
is impossible to consider that this density matrix represent a proper mixture. D’Espagnat has called this 
type of mixture an improper mixture. This point will be important for analyzing what decoherence really 
achieves because that is precisely because of the illegitimate assimilation of improper mixtures to proper 
ones that some authors claimed that decoherence solved the measurement problem. 
Another important point to notice is that no individual system can have a diagonal density matrix with 
more than one non null element. Indeed, an individual system is necessarily in a pure state. Now, as we 
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have seen, if this state is |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |𝜑𝜑1� + 𝛽𝛽 |𝜑𝜑2� in the basis (|𝜑𝜑1⟩,  |𝜑𝜑2�) then the density matrix in this 
basis is: 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = �|𝛼𝛼|2 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽∗𝛼𝛼∗𝛽𝛽 |𝛽𝛽|2�       (28) 
Whereas if the state of the system is only one of the vector of the basis (for example |𝜑𝜑1�) then the 
density matrix is: 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = �1 00 0�       (29) 
One can see that in neither case the density matrix can be: 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆 = �|𝛼𝛼|2 00 |𝛽𝛽|2�      (30) 
with α and β both not null.  Of course this is true for any space of higher dimensionality. 
So, such a diagonal density matrix, when attached to an individual system, describes inevitably an 
improper mixture. This will be important in the following to show that the decoherence process applied 
to an individual system is not sufficient to explain the reduction of the state vector even if it leads to a 
diagonal density matrix. 
 
7.2. The role of the environment 
Following Zeh’s remark, Zurek [59, 60] proposed the following mechanism to explain the reduction. 
Let’s take the environment into account in the measurement process and consider a big system composed 
of the initial measured system plus the apparatus plus the environment. 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸|      (31) 
After the interaction, according to the Schrödinger equation: 
𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩|𝐴𝐴0⟩|𝐸𝐸0⟩ → ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩    (32) 
As previously, we can assume a two dimensional space without loss of generality (and let c1,2 = 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽). 
In the basis ( |𝜑𝜑1�|𝐴𝐴1⟩|𝐸𝐸1⟩,  |𝜑𝜑2�|𝐴𝐴2⟩|𝐸𝐸2⟩) we have, similarly to equation (28):    
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 = �|𝛼𝛼|2 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽∗𝛼𝛼∗𝛽𝛽 |𝛽𝛽|2�      (33) 
Apparently nothing has been gained! In the basis of the Hilbert space which is the tensorial product of 
the Hilbert space of the system plus the apparatus plus the environment, the density matrix has exactly 
the same form as before. 
But the key point comes from the remark that we cannot perform measurements on all the degrees of 
freedom of the environment because that would require apparatuses that are totally out of reach. As we 
have seen, the quantum formalism prescribes in this case that the density matrix of the sub system SA 
formed by the initial system and the apparatus is given by the partial trace on the degrees of freedom of 
the environment of  𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 which can be computed as:  
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 =  𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = � |𝛼𝛼|2 𝑍𝑍𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽∗𝑍𝑍𝛼𝛼∗𝛽𝛽 |𝛽𝛽|2 �     (34) 
Now, it is possible to show that in general the coefficient  𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡) decreases towards 0 very rapidly. So: 
𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) = � |𝛼𝛼|2 𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽∗𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼∗𝛽𝛽 |𝛽𝛽|2 � → �|𝛼𝛼|2 00 |𝛽𝛽|2�    (35) 
This density matrix looks like the density matrix of the equation (22) that describes a statistical mixture 
and no more a pure superposed state. So it seems that each system belonging to the set of systems 
described by 𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) has now a definite state corresponding to one of the eigenvectors of the observable 
that has been measured. This is the reason why many authors (including Zurek in his first papers) thought 
that the decoherence process allows to explain in an objective way the reduction of the state vector. We 
analyze in §7.4 the reasons why this is not correct. 
 
7.3. The preferred basis 
As we have seen previously, a measurement is described as an interaction between a system and an 
apparatus. Let the system S be in a state |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ and the apparatus A be in the initial state |𝐴𝐴0⟩. 
Then, before they interact, the state of the system – apparatus is the tensorial product: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩ =  ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩   (36) 
The usual description assumes that the apparatus is built in such a way that if the measurement is made 
on a system that is in the state |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩, the apparatus will be in the state |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ after the measurement whatever 
its initial state. The Schrodinger equation gives: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴0⟩ → ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ ⊗ |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩   (37) 
The reduction postulate says that if the outcome seen by the observer is one of the |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ then the state of 
the system after the measurement is the corresponding  |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ and the value of the observable that is 
measured is the eigenvalue corresponding to that  |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩. What is implicit in this story is that all the process 
is described in the basis |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ where the |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ are supposed to be the eingenvectors of the observable 
that is measured and the  |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ are supposed to be well defined macroscopic states of the apparatus. But 
we know that there are infinitely many basis of a Hilbert space. The same process could be described in 
any other basis which involves superposed states of the apparatus. Nothing in the quantum rules imposes 
that the basis that is used corresponds to the well-defined macroscopic states of the apparatus (the 
preferred basis). This is only because we know what we can observe that we choose this basis. Let’s 
take the example of a spin ½ particle and a Stern and Gerlach apparatus whose magnetic field is oriented 
along Oz and hence measuring the spin along Oz. The preferred basis is: { |+�
𝑧𝑧
 �↑� , |−�
𝑧𝑧
 �↓�} where  |+�
𝑧𝑧
 (resp. |−�
𝑧𝑧
) is the eigenvector of the observable spin along Oz with the eigenvalue +1/2 
(resp. - 1/2) and  �↑� (resp. �↓�) is the state of the apparatus in which the particle has an impact at the top 
(resp. at the bottom) of the screen. In this basis, the measurement process is described as follows: 
The initial state of the particle is |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝑐𝑐+| +⟩𝑧𝑧 +  𝑐𝑐−|−⟩𝑧𝑧. The Schrodinger equation gives: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = (𝑐𝑐+| +⟩𝑧𝑧 + 𝑐𝑐−|−⟩𝑧𝑧)|𝐴𝐴0⟩ → 𝑐𝑐+| +⟩𝑧𝑧 �↑� +  𝑐𝑐−|−⟩𝑧𝑧 �↓�  (38) 
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So, the previous analysis applies and we have a measurement of spin +1/2 along Ox if we observe an 
impact at the top of the screen, described by the state  �↑� and -1/2 if we observe an impact at the bottom 
of the screen, described by the state  �↓�.  
But assume for example that 𝑐𝑐+ = −𝑐𝑐− = 1/√2. Then |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ is invariant under rotations and can also be 
written in the basis using the eigenstates of the spin along Ox: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 1/√2| +⟩𝑧𝑧 −  1/√2|−⟩𝑧𝑧 = 1/√2| +⟩𝑥𝑥 −  1/√2|−⟩𝑥𝑥    (39) 
In this case, |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ becomes: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = 1/√2| +⟩𝑥𝑥  �⇑� −  1/√2|−⟩𝑥𝑥 �⇓�     (40) 
Where  �⇑� = 1/√2 �↑� + 1/√2  �↓� and  �⇓� = 1/√2 �↑� − 1/√2  �↓� 
The states  �⇑� and  �⇓� of the apparatus correspond to superposed impacts on the screen. Of course such 
states have never been observed but nothing in the formalism says that they must be eliminated. This 
way of writing the measurement is also legitimate and can be interpreted as a measurement of spin +1/2 
along Ox if we observe a superposed impact  �⇑� and -1/2 if we observe a superposed impact  �⇓�. What 
is the reason why the correct description is the one done with the preferred basis? In other terms, why is 
it impossible to measure the spin along Ox with a Stern and Gerlach apparatus whose magnetic field is 
oriented along Oz? The quantum formalism has nothing to say about this question. 
The decoherence theory explains that the reduced density matrix ends up being diagonal in the 
eigenspace of an observable of the apparatus that commutes with the Hamiltonian of interaction between 
the apparatus and the environment. The observable pointer position is such an observable and the 
commutation means that it will be a constant of motion of the interaction Hamiltonian so that the 
interaction with environment will leave it unperturbed. Decoherence hence provides a natural 
explanation for the selection of the preferred basis. 
Let’s notice that decoherence does not apply to a system composed of two electrons where one is the 
system and the other would be assumed to play the role of an apparatus, as is supposed in the relational 
interpretation. So, as we noticed in §3.4, it seems difficult to assume that a measurement has been done 
when two electrons having interacted are in the singlet state. What is the direction along which the spin 
of the first electron is supposed to have been measured relative to the second one? This casts some doubt 
about the validity of this interpretation. The same objection has often been made against Everett’s 
interpretation about the ambiguity of what constitutes the branches. 
 
7.4. The realist interpretation of decoherence 
This is the position of those [62, 63] who want to see decoherence as solving the measurement problem. 
It consists in considering that: 
- first, the transition of the density operator given in equation (35) is justified and hence that the diagonal 
form  
�
|𝛼𝛼|2 00 |𝛽𝛽|2�      (41) 
Is the correct form to use for predictions.  
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- second, this diagonal form is to be interpreted as a proper mixture of systems each of them being in a 
definite state (the states of the basis in which the density matrix is diagonal). Hence, the squares of the 
coefficients α and β are exactly like classical probabilities and are linked to the proportion of systems 
being in one state or the other. 
This interpretation relies on several wrong assumptions and is not acceptable at all [7, 26, 64, 65, 66].  
First of all, the final diagonal form of the density matrix is the result of the partial trace of the global 
density matrix and the reason why this partial trace can be done is entirely due to the fact that it is 
acknowledged that no measurement of the environment is possible for the observer. It gives the correct 
predictions provided that the observer will not do any measurement on the environment. That means 
that the final diagonal form of the density matrix is the form it takes for an observer with limited means 
of measurement. Hence, it is not an objective (without any mention of observer) reduction. Second, the 
small non diagonal terms that have been considered as null (𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡) → 0) are actually not rigorously null 
and can even become again big after a (very) long time. Considering that the diagonal form corresponds 
to the real systems means that the non-diagonal elements which are small but not null, are arbitrarily 
neglected. Those doing that argue that the effects coming from these elements are impossible to observe 
in practice and hence that for all practical purposes (FAPP) the diagonal matrix is equivalent to the non 
diagonal one. This is true FAPP but false in principle. That is not because something cannot be observed 
that it does not exist. So the replacement of the non-diagonal matrix by the diagonal one is illegitimate 
(not for computing but for inferring from it any conceptual conclusion).  
Now, even if we consider the diagonal matrix, it is illegitimate to consider that it is associated with a 
proper mixture of systems each of them being in a definite state. This matrix has been obtained by taking 
the partial trace of the global operator and in this case, even if its form is similar to the form of a density 
operator of a proper mixture, that is not the case. As we have seen above, it is associated with an 
improper mixture. An improper mixture is composed of systems that are all identical. As Bell 
emphasized [3], the correct interpretation should be that each system is in a state where all the 
possibilities are simultaneously present. This is the celebrated “and / or” difficulty. So it is not correct 
to interpret the decoherence process as leading to a set of systems each having a definite state in a 
proportion given by the diagonal coefficients of the matrix.  
This is even clearer if we consider the case of an individual system. We noticed that no individual system 
can have a diagonal density matrix with more than one element not null. So the diagonal density matrix 
got after the partial trace for an individual system must be understood as a mere tool for computing 
probabilities of results in case of a measurement but it is illegitimate to use it to infer something on the 
real state of the system. 
Moreover, decoherence cannot allow to get rid of the reduction postulate as it is clear from the 
consideration of a repeated measurement on the same individual system. For decoherence, without this 
postulate, is dumb about the density matrix that is to be used after having got a definite result. So, 
repeating the same measurement without having projected the state of the system on the eigenvector 
corresponding to the result that has been got, would not guarantee that the same result will occur. In any 
case, it is difficult to see how it could be possible to eliminate the reduction postulate without anything 
replacing it since the preparation of systems (which lies at the very heart of quantum mechanics) relies 
on the fact that in order to assign a state vector to a system, it is first necessary to have made some 
measurements on the system and observed which value are got. 
For all these reasons, the realist interpretation of decoherence is not acceptable and must be replaced by 
a more modest interpretation that I explain below. 
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7.5. What decoherence brings and doesn’t bring 
Solving the measurement problem would mean that, independently of any observer, the initially 
superposed state of the system has been reduced to a definite state. We have seen that it is not the case.  
What is justified to say is that the diagonal form of the density operator is the one that can be used to 
compute (through the usual rules of quantum mechanics including the reduction postulate that cannot 
be forgotten) the probabilities of each result in case of a measurement. Indeed: 
a) The partial trace done on the global operator is justified according to the rule explaining how to deal 
with the density operator when one does not observe some degrees of freedom or when one limits oneself 
to observe a subsystem of a composed system. 
b) Neglecting the very small non-diagonal elements is justified by the fact that if we compute the 
probabilities of interferences due to them, we can see that they are negligible in practice and will never 
be observed. Indeed, we can actually keep the non-diagonal terms and compute the probability to 
observe these macroscopic interference effects. The computation of these probabilities shows that we 
will never observe them in practice. Hence keeping the diagonal form of the density matrix is equivalent 
FAPP to using the fully non-diagonal form.   
So, decoherence explains why macroscopic interferences are never observed. It brings an explanation 
of the classical appearance of the world, provided we use the standard recipes to compute. It explains 
why we (human observers) cannot observe any macroscopic superposition and why what we see is 
conform to the classical description of the world. But the underlying reality (if there is any) remains in 
a superposed and entangled state. If this is taken literally, that means that the reduction postulate is 
nothing but a convenient and practical way to describe the observations but does not correspond to any 
real physical process. 
Now, the standard recipes to compute assume that we know what a measurement is. It is when a 
measurement is made that the probability of finding (observing) a specific result is given by the 
corresponding diagonal element of the density matrix. But nowhere inside the formalism of decoherence 
it is said what a measurement is. Decoherence has nothing to say about the reason why a superposed 
state gives only one result among the many possible ones when a measurement is done. Hence the 
postulate according to which only eigenvalues can be obtained during a measurement has to be 
conserved and the reduction postulate is needed for explaining why a unique value is observed and for 
insuring that immediately repeating a measurement will provide the same result. Hence the problem of 
knowing what a measurement is and when it occurs remains a mystery. In particular, the hope to get rid 
of any mention of observer in the formulation of quantum mechanics is still not fulfilled at all. 
 
8. Convivial Solipsism 
 
Even though today a large number of physicists would still like to consider that science is strongly 
objective and would not even be willing mentioning consciousness, many great physicists of the past 
insisted on the important role that consciousness plays. Planck said [67]: 
“I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot 
get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, 
postulates consciousness.”27 
                                                          
27 I am indebted to Chris Fuchs for this quotation from Planck. 
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The conclusion of all what precedes is that it seems impossible28 to develop a coherent interpretation of 
the quantum formalism that avoids making any reference to the concept of an observer endowed with a 
consciousness. 
Actually it is easy to see that the measurement problem arises in a realist context where one thinks that 
the state vector is representing the physical state of the system independently of any observer and hence, 
such that it is the same for all the observers. It is then considered as an absolute entity. It is in this 
framework that the measurement problem has been formulated in §2.1 following von Neumann. The 
astonishment that the two postulates of evolution give different results is natural as soon as it is 
considered that the two ways of describing the measurement are possible and that the two different final 
state vectors they provide concern the physical state of the system that should be the same for all the 
observers. But if the state vector is now considered to be relative to each observer and if it is clear that 
the reduction postulate must be used only when this very observer becomes aware of one result, then 
there is no more problem. 
As Bitbol says [68]: 
“The measurement problem boils down to finding a way to articulate the indefinite chain of relational 
statements of the quantum theory to the absolute statements that are used in the experimental work. An 
articulation of this kind can easily be found, provided one realizes that the latter absolute statements 
are in fact indexical; provided one realizes that these statements are only absolute relative to us […]. 
At this point one is bound to realize the ineliminability of situatedness from the apparent neutral 
descriptions of quantum mechanics.” 
Convivial Solipsism29 draws all the consequences of these ideas and rests on two main assumptions 
completed by the use of decoherence.  
 
8.1. The first assumption: the hanging up mechanism 
Acknowledging the seeming impossibility to get rid of the concept of consciousness in the measurement 
problem, the first assumption states that a measurement is but the awareness of a result by a conscious 
observer. In Convivial Solipsism, a measurement occurs when (and only when) a conscious observer 
becomes aware of a result. This cancels the ambiguity about when to use the Schrödinger equation and 
when to use the reduction postulate. That looks like the old proposal of London and Bauer and Wigner. 
But, if we take the decoherence process into account, there is now a big difference with their position. 
They thought that the reduction that occurs during a measurement was a physical process through a real 
action of the mind on the system, the mind changing the real physical state of the system. Convivial 
Solipsism defends a much less shocking position. Let’s remind that at the end of the process of 
decoherence the reduced density matrix is diagonal in the preferred basis. We insisted on the fact that it 
does not mean that the measurement problem is solved since this diagonal density matrix is not the 
density matrix of a proper mixture of systems each one in one state of the preferred basis. The systems 
remain in a superposed and entangled state and the reduced density matrix is only a tool giving the 
probabilities for observations. No other physical meaning should be attributed to the reduced density 
matrix. Now, the diagonal form shows that no interference between the states of the preferred basis is 
observable. It remains to explain why only one of the different possible outcomes is observed (the 
famous Bell’s problem “and / or”) and this is precisely what the hanging up mechanism does through 
                                                          
28 I recall that this conclusion is valid inside the context of the standard quantum mechanics assuming that we don’t consider the modifications 
mentioned in §3.1. 
29 Convivial Solipsism is a widely modified and extended version of a first model initially proposed by d’Espagnat [7, 61]. I have first stated 
it in a 2000 book [69]. In a way, it shares some features with the initial position of Everett (but it does not agree with the many-worlds 
interpretation given by Graham and De Witt) except that it clarifies some points that were unclear in Everett’s formulation and that, contrary 
to Everett’s description, it is a one world theory and it is not susceptible to be given a simple realist meaning. 
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the selection of one result as I explain below. The reduction is then a way to describe what appears to 
the observer and does not affect the “reality” (whatever the meaning of this term that we will investigate 
further) which remains superposed.  
The reduction is not a physical process but merely the fact that when a conscious mind makes an 
observation, what it can see is only one of the results described by the diagonal density matrix. That 
does not mean that the state of the system is physically reduced (actually the system remains in an 
entangled state with the apparatus and the environment) but that the conscious mind can only be aware 
of one result that is selected at random following the Born rule.    
Let’s recall what happens in the initial Everett’s interpretation (not in the “many-worlds” interpretation 
that I consider to be undermined by decoherence since it eliminates the possibility to observe, even in 
principle, interferences between the different branches which are causally disconnected). There is no 
reduction (the physical world remains in a superposed state) but the memory of the observer is different 
according to the branches corresponding to possible results.   
If |𝑂𝑂0⟩ is the initial state of the observer and |𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖⟩ the ith state of the observer’s memory: 
𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 = ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩|𝐴𝐴0⟩|𝐸𝐸0⟩ |𝑂𝑂0⟩ → ∑𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖|𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩ |𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖⟩|𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖⟩   (42) 
For Everett, each |𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖⟩ corresponds to an experience of the observer having the feeling (or the memory) 
to have observed the result |𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖⟩. 
Now, contrarily to what happens in Everett’s interpretation where the observer has as many relative 
states in which he is aware of one definite result as there are possible results, in Convivial Solipsism, 
we assume that the observer is aware of only one result which is selected at random. I call that the 
“hanging-up mechanism”. Of course, the hanging-up mechanism has exactly the same status (it must be 
postulated and one cannot do without it) and a role similar (but slightly weaker as we will see in §8.3) 
than the reduction postulate. It is a weak reformulation of it. But the conditions of its usage are clearly 
given and there is no more ambiguity about when to use it. 
So, the first assumption is: 
“A measurement is the awareness of a result by a conscious observer whose consciousness selects at 
random (according to the Born rule) one branch of the entangled state vector written in the preferred 
basis and hangs-up to it. Once the consciousness is hung-up to one branch, it will hang-up only to 
branches that are daughters of this branch for all the following observations.” 
The last part of the first assumption guarantees that repeating the same measurement will give again the 
same result. 
Assume for example that the system is a spin 1/2 particle in a superposed state along Oz. 
 |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧     (43) 
After the interaction with the apparatus and taking the environment into account the global state is: 
 |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−�    (44) 
If we include the state of the observer we get: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� |� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−� |�   (45) 
We have here to make a difference between the physical brain of the observer and her consciousness.  |� and  |� are the state of the brain of the observer. Now, the hanging up mechanism says that the 
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consciousness of the observer chooses one branch at random (respecting the Born rule linked to the 
coefficients of the linear combination). Let’s denote by �  the fact to be aware of having seen “+” and 
by �   the fact to be aware of having seen ”-“ then after the hanging up mechanism, either �  or � . 
Here we must be very clear about not to confuse  |� with �  and  |� with � .  |� and  |� are physical 
states of the observer’s brain that enter into the entangled universal sate vector.  �  and �  are not state 
vectors and cannot enter into any linear combination with state vectors. That is the reason why they are 
not written as kets. They are just representing non physical states of awareness. 
So, even if the universal entangled wave function is not reduced and remains as written in equation (45), 
for all subsequent measurements, everything happens for this observer as if the wave function was 
reduced either to  |+�
𝑧𝑧
 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� |�  if her state of awareness is  �  or to  |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−� |� if her state 
of awareness is  � . This insures that repeating the same measurement will give the same result. 
Assume that � . What happens if we measure now an observable which does not commute with the spin 
along Oz, for example the spin along Ox? Let’s denote now with index 1 what is related to the results 
of the first measurement along Oz and with index 2 what is related to the second measurement along 
Ox. So we have  �1 after the first measurement. After the second measurement, the final entangled state 
will be: |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼√2   |�1 � |+�𝑥𝑥 |↑�1 |𝐸𝐸+�1 |↑�2 |𝐸𝐸+�2 |�2 +  |−�𝑥𝑥 |↑�1 |𝐸𝐸+�1 |↓�2 |𝐸𝐸−�2 |�2� +
𝛽𝛽
√2
 |�
1
� |+�
𝑥𝑥
 |↓�
1
 |𝐸𝐸−�1 |↑�2 |𝐸𝐸+�2 |�2 −  |−�𝑥𝑥 |↓�1 |𝐸𝐸−�1 |↓�2 |𝐸𝐸−�2 |�2�   (46) 
The hanging-up mechanism says that since we have  �1 after the first measurement, the selection for 
the second measurement must be done among the states that are correlated to |�
1
. The only term to 
consider is then:  |+�
𝑥𝑥
 |↑�
1
 |𝐸𝐸+�1 |↑�2 |𝐸𝐸+�2 |�1 |�2 +  |−�𝑥𝑥  |↑�1 |𝐸𝐸+�1 |↓�2 |𝐸𝐸−�2 |�1 |�2  (47) 
So the final state of awareness will be either �1�2 corresponding to a spin + along Ox or  �1 �2 
corresponding to a spin – along Ox (each one with a probability ½) which is conform to the usual 
prediction stating that if one performs a measurement of spin along Ox on a particle in a state + of spin 
along Oz, the possible results are + and – with probability ½. 
Nevertheless, the physical state of the observer’s brain continues to be superposed and entangled as 
described in equation (46) with the rest of the universe) even if the observer cannot be conscious of what 
happens in the other branches. 
Of course that is totally unfaithful to the spirit of Everett who wanted to eliminate the reduction 
postulate. But it is greatly more economic regarding the number of conscious states of one observer and 
as soon as we are able to give first a rule stating when it must be used and second a reason why this 
hanging-up mechanism occurs, the repugnant aspect30 of the reduction postulate becomes more 
acceptable. So let’s give a simplified image. A pictorial way to understand that would be to think that 
among the many possibilities of the superposed state of the brain (however chosen only among those 
belonging to the preferred basis), only one of them is accessible to the consciousness very similarly to 
what could happen if, watching to a multi colored picture through one pair of colored glasses, the 
observer would see the picture colored with the unique same color than the glasses. Moreover, imagine 
                                                          
30 According to some letters, Everett considered Bohr’s approach as “somewhat repugnant” [70]. 
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that the observer draws one colored pair of glasses at random from an urn full of pairs of glasses of 
different colors, the color she would think the picture is would be predictable only in a probabilistic 
way. The physical brain of the observer is in an entangled state but the consciousness of the observer, 
due to internal filters that play the same role than the colored glasses, is able to hang-up to only one of 
the components of the entangled state. The filter that is selected is chosen at random following the 
probabilistic law given by the coefficient ci and so the Born rule is respected31. So, even if the wave 
function is never reduced, as in Everett interpretation, a great advantage of Convivial Solipsism is that 
it is not subject to the same problem for recovering the Born rule. 
The question is then whether there can be any conflict between different observers hung-up to different 
branches. The answer is no for, as d’Espagnat puts it: 
“Any transfer of information from B to A – for example, any answer made by B to a question asked by 
A – unavoidably proceeds through physical means. Therefore it necessary takes the form of a 
measurement made by A on B. And we know that under these conditions A necessarily gets a response 
(answer) that agrees with his own perception” [61]. 
For any observer, everything outside her own private consciousness has to be treated as a quantum 
system obeying quantum mechanics. This is true of course of electrons but also of macroscopic objects 
and even of other conscious observers. This is quite similar to what we described for the relational 
interpretation and QBism. Hence, when an observer, say Alice, speaks with another one, Bob, it is as if 
Alice was doing a measurement on Bob. Let’s take an example: the measurement of the spin along Oz 
of an electron in an initial superposed state of spin. Suppose Bob has performed such a measurement on 
this electron. From Bob’s point of view, a measurement has been made and he knows the value of the 
spin along Oz of this electron. According to the hanging-up mechanism stated above, Bob’s 
consciousness is hung-up to one of the two possible branches linked with the results up or down. From 
Alice’s point of view, Bob becomes entangled with the electron, as described by the Schrödinger 
equation. That’s again Wigner’s friend problem. Now Alice can perform the same measurement on the 
electron. And Alice’s consciousness will be hung-up as well to one of the two branches and will see one 
value. The crucial point is that this branch includes the state of Bob that is linked to the same value. So 
when Alice, hung-up to that branch, speaks with Bob to know what Bob saw, she performs a 
measurement on Bob and cannot hear Bob saying anything else than the same value that she got before. 
That’s exactly the same mechanism than repeating the same measurement on a system initially in a 
superposed state. The second measurement will inevitably yield the same result. Alice will never hear 
Bob saying that he saw up when she saw down. No conflict is possible.  
Now, the unavoidable question comes: Is it possible that Bob saw “up” and Alice “down” even if Alice 
will never know? Actually, as we noticed before, this question assumes that we adopt a meta point of 
view allowing us to speak simultaneously of what Bob and Alice saw. This meta point of view (third 
person point of view) is like God view, an absolute view assuming that it is meaningful to speak as a 
meta observer using absolute independent states. But in Convivial Solipsism, such an absolute meta 
point of view does not exist. So, even if it is tempting to adopt this meta level, to wonder if Alice and 
Bob can “really” see different things, has no meaning. Juxtaposing different points of view is not 
allowed. Hence, the intersubjective agreement is preserved because the communication between 
different observers is nothing but a measurement of one observer on the other. But this aspect, that we 
                                                          
31 Actually this description could let think that the observer is facing the world which is given in front of her eyes. That is absolutely not what 
is assumed in Convivial Solipsism as we will see in §8.2. The explanation given here must be taken as a very limited analogy to help 
understanding the filters which prevent us to be in superposed states of consciousness. Indeed, the hanging-up mechanism has to be seen as a 
co-construction, from the world and the mind, of the result as we explain in §8.2. 
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already discussed in §3.4.2 and §3.4.3 about the relational interpretation and QBism, is much clearer if 
we go right to the end of what that means. This is the second assumption. 
 
8.2. The second assumption 
All what has been said until now, could be understood as if there was a unique independent real world 
that all the observers witness (even if they are part of it) and which is described by the entangled global 
wave function that is never reduced. Of course, each observer would have her own private conscious 
experience of this universe (that could be different from one observer to the other depending on the 
branch to which she is hung-up) but the global wave function would be the same for all the observers 
and would be “The” wave function of a universe conceived as unique and independent of the observers. 
That is the point of view of Everett’s interpretation32. In this case, we would recover a certain kind of 
realism even if the universe so described would be very different from the universe that each observer 
perceives. But Convivial Solipsism shares with QBism and the relational interpretation the idea that the 
entities inside the quantum formalism (state vectors and probabilities) are relative.  
The second assumption is then: 
“Any state vector is relative to a given conscious observer and cannot be considered in an absolute way.” 
That is similar to the assumption that state vectors are relative to systems (relational interpretation) or 
to agents (QBism). But the difference is that Convivial Solipsism assumes that a conscious observer is 
necessary.  
In Convivial Solipsism, the state vectors, including the universal entangled one, are relative to one 
conscious observer. That means that even the universal entangled wave function has no absolute and 
universal validity but is relative to each observer. It represents only the description of the universe for a 
specific observer. In this case, one may ask what that means to continue speaking of a universe. The 
universe is no more an absolute reality existing outside and independently of any observer but is relative 
to each observer. That does not mean however that nothing else than the mind exists and that the universe 
is totally created by the consciousness of each observer. That would amount to coming back to a pure 
idealist position which is not what Convivial Solipsism lauds. Indeed, it is well known that pure idealism 
faces many difficulties.  
Convivial Solipsism rather assumes that “there is something” else than consciousness, something that is 
not appropriate to talk of (similar to the Kantian thing in itself) and that consciousness33 and “this 
something” give rise to what each observer thinks it is her reality, following Putnam’s famous statement 
“the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world”. So perception is not a passive affair: 
perceiving is not simply witnessing what is in front of us but is creating what we perceive through a co-
construction from the world and the mind. In this respect, Convivial Solipsism is close to QBism since 
it considers that an observation does not reveal a preexisting state of affair but is a creation. But where 
QBism is dumb about how this creation can happen, Convivial Solipsism explains that each conscious 
observer builds her own world through the hanging-up mechanism34. 
                                                          
32 Actually, this is more conform to the initial point of view of Everett and not to the many-worlds interpretation given by Graham and De 
Witt. 
33 I will let here the concept of consciousness unanalyzed and take it as a basic given fact. It is enough to know what I mean when I say that I 
am conscious. I know and we all know what that means to perceive something in a conscious way. At the price of risking to be accused of 
instrumentalism, I would say that nothing more is needed here. I just want to stress the point that this does not mean that I support any version 
of dualism. But going further would lead to too speculative and unnecessary assumptions out of the scope of the present paper.  
34 Actually the ontology of Convivial Solipsism and the joint process of construction of the mind and the world are slightly more sophisticated 
and will be described in more details in a forthcoming more philosophically inclined paper. The simplified version given here is however 
faithful enough in the context of this paper to not distort the fundamental underlying idea.  
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That is a sort of solipsism because the consciousness of each observer is located inside its own branch 
of its own relative universal state vector independently of the others. But that is not a true solipsism as 
it welcomes both others minds and an external stuff that is independent of the mind. It is closer to Kant 
transcendental idealism. Now, it is convivial since no conflict is possible: the quantum rules together 
with the hanging-up mechanism for each observer prevent any possibility to notice a divergence between 
the perceptions of two different observers.   
There is another striking consequence which is a strange answer to the famous phrase of Einstein: God 
does not play dice. Einstein was right, God does not play dice but each of us does! This is so because 
the random aspect of the quantum predictions comes, not from the fact that the physical systems change 
at random (the dynamic of the Universe, even if relative, is fully deterministic) but from the random 
way your consciousness chooses the branch to which it hangs-up!  
 
8.3. The hanging-up mechanism reformulated and the contextuality of quantum mechanics 
Now there is a subtlety that I have passed over in the way I presented the hanging-up mechanism above. 
The correct way to understand the hanging-up mechanism is a little bit more complex than equation (45) 
could let think, if both decoherence and the relativity of states are taken into account. 
Let’s start again from equation (44): |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−�. This state is the 
relative (for the observer) state of entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment 
after the interaction between them, written in the preferred basis selected through the Hamiltonian of 
interaction between the apparatus and the environment. By using the hanging-up mechanism directly 
applied to equation (45): |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� |� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−� |�, and concluding directly 
that either  �  or � , we have cut short the decoherence process that is needed to suppress the possibility 
to observe macroscopic interferences. We have used the hanging-up mechanism exactly like the 
reduction postulate was used in the measurement theory before decoherence. We could as well have 
started from |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� and get the entangled state with the observer |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⟩ =
𝛼𝛼 |+�
𝑧𝑧
 |↑� |� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�
𝑧𝑧
 |↓� |� to conclude that the consciousness of the observer hangs-up to one of 
the branch and becomes either  �  or � . No use of the environment has really been made in this 
presentation. The fact that we got a correct conclusion is only the reflection of the fact that in general, 
the reduction postulate can be considered as a shortcut to the decoherence processs, giving correct results 
when the state vector is written in the preferred basis considered as already known (which is the case 
for empirical reasons when we use an apparatus built for measuring a specific observable). Now this is 
not strictly correct and in particular this has a consequence that we want to avoid: it cancels any 
possibility to observe (even in principle) the interferences coming from the fact that the universal state 
vector remains superposed. This is precisely what led us to discard the many-worlds interpretation for 
the benefit of the initial Everett’s version. 
The correct way to describe the hanging-up mechanism is the following. We start from equation (44): |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸⟩ = 𝛼𝛼 |+�𝑧𝑧 |↑� |𝐸𝐸+� + 𝛽𝛽 |−�𝑧𝑧 |↓� |𝐸𝐸−�. We assume here that the universe is limited to the system, 
the apparatus, the environment and the observer. Then equation (44) is the most general state vector that 
the observer can assign to the universe (herself excepted) after the interaction. Let’s notice that this 
equation could be written in any basis. Then a choice has to be made about what kind of future 
measurements will not be performed on the universe. This choice can come either from physical limits 
(compulsory for the observer, such for example the physical impossibility to use an apparatus bigger 
that the universe) or from a deliberate choice of the observer. Then, a partial trace on the density matrix 
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𝜚𝜚𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 = |𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸⟩⟨𝛹𝛹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸| on the degree of liberty that will not be observed must be done to get a reduced 
density matrix which describes the (still entangled) universe that is accessible to observation. This is 
only at this step that the decoherence process gives a diagonal density matrix. Now the hanging-up 
mechanism says that the consciousness of the observer hangs-up to one of the states of the basis in which 
the reduced density matrix is diagonal with a probability that is given by the diagonal elements. In the 
case of the measurement of the spin we used, under the assumption that we do not observe the 
environment, that leads to exactly the same result than the simplified presentation. Now, if we change 
the assumption about what it is possible to observe in principle (for example assuming that we can 
measure correlations with the environment), we will trace off different degrees of freedom and will get 
a new reduced density matrix. It will then become possible that the consciousness of the observer hangs-
up to states that show some interferences between the components of the reduced density matrix that we 
got previously through more stringent restrictions about what can be measured. That means that the 
branch to which the consciousness hangs-up depends on what is unobservable for the observer and that 
all the components of the universal entangled state vector are remaining present as it is the case in the 
initial version of Everett’s interpretation. 
In the vast majority of cases, this second formulation of the hanging-up mechanism is equivalent to the 
first one. Nevertheless, the second formulation has two advantages. First, it avoids cutting branches as 
if once an observation has been made by an observer, the world relative to this observer was no more in 
a superposed entangled state. Second, it lets decoherence play its full role in providing the observer with 
the only branches that are accessible for the hanging-up of her consciousness, depending on what is 
traced off. Hence, the hanging-up mechanism is a weaker postulate than the reduction postulate since it 
is not in any state of a superposition that the consciousness can be projected but only in those allowed 
by the decoherence process. 
Bohr’s claim according to which the value of an observable belongs not to the system but to the whole 
composed of the system plus the apparatus becomes now easy to understand and even obvious35. 
Through the hanging-up mechanism the value that is measured is not something objective attached to 
the system but is only the result of the fact that the consciousness of the observer hangs-up to one of the 
possible branches of the entangled state vector written in the preferred basis which, in turn, can be 
defined only when the apparatus and its interaction with the environment have been chosen. Therefore 
the very concept of an objective value attached only to a system independently of any apparatus is 
meaningless. It is even clearer if we remember how this value is obtained. What decoherence and the 
hanging-up mechanism say is that the observer’s consciousness can only be aware of one of the branches 
written in the preferred basis. But actually, what the observer’s consciousness is aware of is only the 
macroscopic state of the apparatus because this is what she observes during a measurement (the 
microscopic system is of course not directly observable). Hence, the value attributed to the observable 
of the system is only a deduction made by the observer according to the following reasoning: a) I see 
this macroscopic state of the apparatus, b) this state is correlated to this eigenstate of the microsystem 
in the branch of the entangled vector state, c) hence, the system is in this eigenstate, d) so the observable 
has the eigenvalue associated to this eigenstate. But this reasoning is possible only if the observer has 
gone through all the process of decoherence and hanging-up which is not possible without an apparatus. 
From the point of view of Convivial Solipsism, Bohr’s claim should even be extended to include the 
observer.   
                                                          
35 Of course, I do not pretend that Bohr had Convivial Solipsism in mind when he claimed that. His claim was a useful assumption helping 
him to fight against the EPR argument. Convivial Solipsism gives a good reason to understand why Bohr was right even though he probably 
would not have liked it. 
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8.4. EPR and non locality 
As Fine says [51]: 
“Of course it may also be possible to break the EPR argument for the dilemma plausibly by questioning 
some of its other assumptions (e.g., separability, the reduction postulate, the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, 
or a common assumption of measurement independence). That might free up the remaining option, to 
regard the theory as both local and complete. Perhaps a well-developed version of the Everett 
Interpretation would come to occupy this branch of the interpretive tree.”  
Convivial Solipsism could be regarded as this kind of version of Everett’s interpretation that Fine has 
in mind even though the hanging-up mechanism needs to be added. Now, QBism, the relational 
interpretation and some pragmatist interpretations [71] claim that in their framework the EPR paradox 
vanishes and that non locality does not exist. But the reasons for that are not exactly the same and vary 
according to the interpretation. I present here why this is the case in Convivial Solipsism. The EPR 
paradox comes from the assumption that when Alice and Bob do their measurement, each one on one 
particle, then the result of their measurement is valid instantaneously for any other observer. In case of 
an initial singlet state, when Alice finds the value “up” on the first particle, it is assumed that this value 
is “down” for the second particle immediately for herself and for Bob. The consequence is that it seems 
that at the very moment when Alice does her measurement, everything is determined both for herself 
and Bob. Indeed when she asks Bob, later, which value he found on his particle, she will hear “down” 
and this is true even if Bob’s measurement and Alice’s measurement are space-like separated. So it 
seems that the very fact that Alice found “up”, determined instantaneously the value “down” for Bob’s 
particle (and vice versa since if the two measurements are space-like separated, no one can be said to be 
before the other in an absolute way). To be more precise, the reasoning goes like that: when Alice asks 
Bob which result he got and hears “down”, she deduces in retrospect that the value has been “down” as 
soon as Bob did his measurement. If their measurements are space-like separated this implies a spooky 
instantaneous action at a distance. This consequence relies on the assumption that state vectors are 
representing objective physical descriptions of systems and that they are changed by measurements. But 
if we describe the situation in Convivial Solipsism, this is not true anymore. Indeed, it is only when 
Alice asks Bob (in the future of her measurement) which value he found that she performs a 
measurement on Bob and learns what is the result he got on his particle. So, the hanging-up mechanism 
plays its role and we know that according to it, she will necessarily hear “down” which is the only result 
in agreement with her own measurement on the first particle. We know also that if she then performs a 
measurement on Bob’s particle, she will find the same “down” value. But that does not mean that the 
second particle “was already before” in the state “down”. Indeed, the hanging-up mechanism is nothing 
else than the fact that Alice’s consciousness hangs-up to the branch corresponding to the value “up” for 
her particle and “down” for Bob’s particle, while the state vector of the systems remains unchanged. 
These posterior measurements done by Alice are of course time-like separated with Alice’s first 
measurement and moreover, they do not affect physically the state of the system. There is no more 
“spooky instantaneous action at a distance”.36 
 
9. In summary 
Convivial Solipsism (with decoherence) gives satisfying answers to all the questions raised in §6. Of 
course, the picture it offers can seem a little weird since it means abandoning the idea of an absolute 
                                                          
36 Actually, it seems that for QBists, the solution is even simpler. They reject the fact that a probability 1 assignment needs to be backed by an 
objective fact. Hence, the conclusion of EPR relative to this “element of reality” which can be predicted with probability 1 does not follow 
anymore. I am not totally convinced because I think that their position about probability 1 raises philosophical problems that should be 
addressed more carefully after a clarification of the questions mentioned in  §3.4.3. 
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external reality which is the same for everybody. It forbids even considering as meaningful usual 
sentences that compare the private experience of observers. But abandoning simultaneity was also 
something shocking for many scientists at the beginning of the twentieth century even though we are all 
accustomed to it now.  
If we let aside the extreme instrumentalist positions which say that the metaphysical questions are not 
to be considered, it is now possible to understand the appeal of many interpretations that have been 
previously proposed even if no one succeeded in providing a coherent global answer to all the questions. 
This appeal comes from the fact that they all share a part of the whole story:  
- The Copenhagen interpretation correctly stressed the fundamental role of the experiment and the 
contextual aspect of the measurement but failed to identify (or at least to make clear) the role of the 
observer. 
- Wigner, London and Bauer correctly noticed that it is impossible to give a coherent interpretation of 
quantum mechanics without mentioning consciousness. But they wanted it to play a role that is not 
acceptable. 
- Everett in the initial version is close to a coherent picture but, even if it would be unfair to blame him 
for that, his interpretation needs to be complemented by decoherence. Moreover, the many attacks 
against his position come from the unclear aspect of this huge multiplication of states of consciousness 
of the observer and from the difficulty to give any meaning to probabilities and to recover the Born rule. 
- The relational interpretation shares with QBism and Convivial Solipsism the concept of relative states. 
But, as we saw, the way it deals with measurement is unacceptable. 
- QBism, conceived as an instrumentalist interpretation has the merit to clearly state when the reduction 
postulate must be used. But, plunging into more philosophical questions leads to many unanswered 
questions. Moreover, without any mention to decoherence, QBism is unable to explain the classical 
appearance of the world that is nevertheless part of each agent’s private experience. 
Convivial Solipsism gathers Everett’s initial position, decoherence and relativity of states in a coherent 
whole that allows giving answers to the main questions that have been raised at the beginning of this 
paper. Of course, we must recognize that the image it gives is very unfamiliar and that it is even further 
from the usual scientific realism than any other proposed interpretation. But, isn’t it the case that 
quantum mechanics has already accustomed us to very strange things? 
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